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Article
Personalized Pricing as Monopolization
RAMSI A. WOODCOCK
The advance of the information age will allow firms to engage in personalized
pricing, a form of price discrimination that is profitable for firms, but
unambiguously harmful to consumers. Antitrust can protect consumers from
personalized pricing—also called perfect price discrimination—by condemning the
steps firms must take to prevent resellers from undermining firms’ personalized
pricing schemes. To personalize prices successfully, a firm must prevent those to
whom the firm wishes to charge low prices from reselling the product to those to
whom the firm wishes to charge high prices. Otherwise, resellers will compete away
any difference in prices. But such steps amount to conduct that harms competitors—
here, resellers—and ultimately the consumers who pay the personalized prices that
result. A firm that personalizes prices must therefore do the three things that
together constitute illegal monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: harm
competition, and consumers, in order profitably to raise prices. The right to refuse
to deal with competitors, which would normally exempt this conduct from antitrust
scrutiny, does not apply to personalized pricing because an available remedy—an
order prohibiting personalized pricing, but not forcing firms to sell to resellers—
does not lead to the forced sharing and judicial price administration that the right
to refuse to deal is meant to avoid.
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Personalized Pricing as Monopolization
RAMSI A. WOODCOCK *
INTRODUCTION
Price discrimination, the charging of different prices to different
consumers for the same product, appears to have taken the economy by
storm in recent years, spreading from early pioneers in the airline business
to nearly every corner of the economy: from Amazon, which varies the
prices of thousands of items hundreds of time per day, to Broadway shows,
which now vary ticket prices based on day-to-day sales trends, to Disney
World, which now varies entrance fees based on expected demand.1
*
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, Secondary Appointment,
Department of Management, University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics. Russell
D. Covey, Allen Grunes, Thomas Horton, Friedemann Kainer, Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Nirej Sekhon, and
participants at the 18th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium and the 2018 Annual Conference of the
Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation provided helpful comments.
1
The technical definition of “price discrimination” is the earning of different rates of return on units
of the same product, meaning that the difference between unit cost and price is different for different
units. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 621 (4th ed. 2011). By contrast, economists call the charging of different prices to different
consumers “differential pricing.” See id. This Article is concerned with a particular form of price
discrimination, namely, personalized pricing, that seeks to charge each consumer the maximum that the
consumer is willing to pay for the product. See infra note 11 and accompanying text. Other than in the
unlikely case that all consumers have the same maximum willingness to pay for all units of the product
that they purchase, personalized pricing will therefore always involve the charging of different prices for
different units, and so will always be differential pricing. It therefore will not be necessary, in this Article,
to distinguish between the earning of different rates of return and the charging of different prices.
For price discrimination by Amazon, see Harry Wallop, How Amazon Can Rip You Off by Changing
MAIL
(Sept.
29,
2017,
8:29
PM),
Prices
300
Times
a
Year,
DAILY
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4935422/How-Amazon-rip-changing-prices-300-times.html.
For price discrimination by Disney World, see S.K., Disney Discovers Peak Pricing, ECONOMIST (Feb.
29, 2016), https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2016/02/29/disney-discovers-peak-pricing. For
price discrimination in Broadway ticket pricing, see Patrick Healy, New Pricing Strategy Makes the Most
of Hot Broadway Tickets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/arts/newpricing-strategy-makes-the-most-of-hot-broadway-tickets.html. For the origins in the airline industry of
personalized pricing in its modern technology-enabled form, see RICHARD H.K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED
COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 69, 72–73 (1996); Robert G. Cross et al.,
Milestones in the Application of Analytical Pricing and Revenue Management, 10 J. REVENUE & PRICING
MGMT. 8, 9–10 (2011).
When a firm changes prices over time, the firm may be engaged in price discrimination or in
dynamic pricing. Unlike price discrimination, which is the adjusting of prices based on old information
about consumer characteristics, dynamic pricing is the adjusting of prices based on new information
about demand. The firms listed here, like virtually all firms that charge consumers different prices for
the same product, claim to be engaged in dynamic pricing, rather than price discrimination. See Ramsi
A. Woodcock, Dynamic Pricing as Monopolization, 105 IOWA L. REV. (2019) (manuscript at 9–13) (on
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Consumers are only slowly starting to realize that there are few purchases
left for which they are likely to pay the same price as a neighbor.2
All price discrimination has a single ultimate end, to charge each
individual consumer a price personalized to match that consumer’s
maximum willingness to pay for the product, because charging the highest
possible prices that consumers are willing to pay maximizes profits.3
Achieving that goal is difficult, however, because it requires hyper-accurate
information about consumer willingness to pay.4 Charge a price too high,
and no profit is earned at all because the consumer will not buy. Charge a
price too low, and money is left on the table. The last-minute airline
passenger who pays more for an economy class seat than the passenger
across the aisle pays more because the airline knows that last-minute buyers
tend in fact to be willing to pay more.5 But the airlines do not yet know
exactly how much more each individual last-minute buyer would be willing
to pay, limiting the airlines’ ability at present to extract the maximum
possible profit from consumers.6 As firms learn more about their customers,
and artificial intelligence and machine learning make it easier for them to
understand the data, firms will improve their accuracy in predicting how
much each individual consumer is willing to pay.7 The airlines will no longer
rely only on the time when a consumer purchases in trying to infer whether
a consumer is willing to pay more.8 Purchase histories, income data, the
file with author). But it is difficult to tell whether a price that varies over time is responding to old or new
information, and it is therefore likely that some of the new variability of pricing practiced by firms
represents price discrimination, and not dynamic pricing.
2
See Neil Howe, A Special Price Just for You, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2017, 5:56 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilhowe/2017/11/17/a-special-price-just-for-you/.
3
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 769–72 (5th ed. 2016) (comparing the profitability of various forms of price discrimination).
4
See Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG. 597, 5–6 (1989).
5
See ROBERT H. FRANK, THE ECONOMIC NATURALIST: IN SEARCH OF EXPLANATIONS FOR
EVERYDAY ENIGMAS 82–83 (2007).
6
See William J. Niejadlik, A Spotlight on Total Offer Optimization, AMADEUS THOUGHT
LEADERSHIP PAPER 7 (2017), https://amadeus.com/documents/en/airlines/research-report/a-spotlighton-total-offer-optimization-web.pdf (“Most revenue management systems also have not incorporated the
effect of loyalty and product personalization into their approaches.”).
7
See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1371,
1371–75 (2017); ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND
PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 89–100 (2016) (arguing that perfect price discrimination
is coming, but “unlikely in many markets in the near future”); MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES,
BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY 310 (2016) (observing that big data will help companies “better
price discriminate”).
8
See Niejadlik, supra note 6, at 11 (arguing that artificial intelligence and machine learning will
enable personalized pricing in the airline industry); Anita Ramasastry, Personalized Pricing in the Air?
Why Consumers Should Be Wary of a New Airline Pricing Proposal, JUSTIA: VERDICT (May 13, 2015),
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/05/13/personalized-pricing-in-the-air-why-consumers-should-be-waryof-a-new-airline-pricing-proposal (discussing a 2014 grant of approval by the U.S. Department of
Transportation to the airlines to collect personalized customer data that could be used to charge
personalized prices).
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movement of the consumer’s mouse on the airline’s webpage, and much
more, will give the airline a rich portrait of who the consumer is, and through
that picture, how much the consumer is willing to pay.9 As this learning
process spreads across the economy, consumers will enter a world in which
the consumer will pay a price personalized with increasing accuracy to equal
the maximum the consumer is willing to pay for every single purchase that
the consumer makes.10
Prices tailored to the individual maximum that a consumer is willing to
pay, called first-degree price discrimination or personalized pricing here,
harm consumers, by ensuring that each consumer gives up a value, in the
form of the price paid, that is equal to the value the consumer places on the
good, leaving the consumer no better off than if the consumer had never
made the purchase at all.11 In economic terms, the practice deprives
consumers of the entire surplus generated by the transaction.12 One approach
to protecting consumers from personalized pricing would be to use the
antitrust laws to impose a ban.13 The Robinson-Patman Act, which is part of
9

See Niejadlik, supra note 6, at 15 (arguing that airlines will need “shopping and conversion,
customer behavior, and ancillary sales data” to personalize prices); Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1372–
74; Nitasha Tiku, The Dark Side of “Replay Sessions” That Record Your Every Move Online, WIRED
(Nov. 16, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-dark-side-of-replay-sessions-that-recordyour-every-move-online/.
10
Uber took a step in this direction when it moved to “route-based” pricing from mileage-based
pricing. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Starts Charging What It Thinks You’re Willing to Pay (May 19, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-19/uber-s-future-may-rely-on-predicting-howmuch-you-re-willing-to-pay (“[Uber] detailed for the first time in an interview with Bloomberg a new
pricing system that’s been in testing for months in certain cities. On Friday, Uber acknowledged to drivers
the discrepancy between their compensation and what riders pay. The new fare system is called ‘routebased pricing,’ and it charges customers based on what it predicts they’re willing to pay. It’s a break from
the past, when Uber calculated fares using a combination of mileage, time and multipliers based on
geographic demand.”).
11
See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 446 (7th ed.
2006) (observing that under first-degree price discrimination consumers are “just willing to purchase the
good”); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 4 (Feb. 2015) (associating the term “personalized pricing” with
first-degree price discrimination). Personalized pricing is also sometimes called tailored pricing,
individualized pricing, or perfect price discrimination.
12
See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 306 (1990). An important
qualification is that personalized pricing may strengthen competition between oligopolists, creating a
counterbalancing downward pressure on prices. The condition for this to occur is that the substitute
products sold by the members of the oligopoly not be too different from each other. Lars A. Stole, Price
Discrimination and Imperfect Competition, 3 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG. 34, 7 (2003). For a discussion of
this qualification, see infra note 65.
13
See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1415–16. Two other options are deconcentration of markets and
use of big data by government to set prices in all markets. See id. at 1376–77; Ramsi A. Woodcock,
Personalized Price Regulation as an Income Tax Alternative 5–6 (2019) (working paper on file with
author). I consider these options in detail elsewhere, but do not address them further in this Article. See
Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1400–1415; Woodcock, supra note 13, at 49–57 (working paper on file with
author). Both alternative approaches have the virtue of allowing firms to realize the efficiency benefits
of personalized pricing while preventing firms from using personalized pricing to extract too much profit
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the antitrust laws, might at first appear to be the appropriate vehicle, because
the Act bans certain types of price discrimination.14 But the RobinsonPatman Act is in fact of little help. The Act targets bulk discounts made by
manufacturers to large retailers, such as discounts to retail behemoths like
Walmart or Amazon that put small retailers with low sales volumes at a
competitive disadvantage.15 But the Act does not apply to the pricing of
goods sold to consumers, and is rarely enforced even within its limited
ambit, making it useless as a tool for banning personalized pricing.16 A ban
on personalized pricing might instead be achieved by new legislation.17 This
from consumers. See infra Section I.A.2 (discussing the efficiency benefits of personalized pricing).
Indeed, government exploitation of personalized pricing would even permit use of personalized prices
efficiently to redistribute wealth in favor of consumers, rather than firms. A ban on personalized pricing
would not realize the efficiency benefits of personalized pricing, but would prevent firms from using
personalized pricing to extract excessive profits from consumers. See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1415.
14
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, . . . either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality . . . .”); see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 629 (describing the act as “disguised as an antitrust
law”).
15
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 629 (“[Congress was] concerned that small businesses,
particularly small retailers, were rapidly losing market share to large ‘chain stores’ that were able to
underbuy and thus to undersell the small operators.”).
16
See Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 358 (2002)
(“[T]he Act is not generally believed to apply to consumer transactions[.]”); John B. Kirkwood,
Reforming the Robinson-Patman Act to Serve Consumers and Control Powerful Buyers, 60 ANTITRUST
BULL. 358, 375 (2015) (observing that government enforcement has “withered to the point of nonexistence,” with no government case having been brought under the act since 2000). Another limitation
is that the Act applies only to physical goods. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2018) (prohibiting price
discrimination only in the sale of “commodities”).
The inapplicability of the Act to price discrimination in consumer markets arises from the Act’s
requirement that the effect of the discrimination be to injure competition in some way. Id. (prohibiting
price discrimination “where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition”). Price discrimination has this effect in supply markets, because bulk discounts to larger
retailers make it difficult for small retailers to compete. Cf. Kirkwood, supra note 16, at 359 (lamenting
the fact that despite this orientation, the Act has not actually been used against large retailers that are
believed to have a competitive advantage arising from obtaining bulk discounts from suppliers). But in
consumer markets, price discrimination is a symptom of the absence of competition, not its cause. See
infra text accompanying note 104. A retailer can personalize prices to consumers only if other retailers
are unable to undercut those prices. See infra text accompanying note 59. Accordingly, the act of price
discrimination itself cannot be shown to injure competition in such markets. Like the Robinson-Patman
Act, the Sherman Act also requires a showing of injury to competition. See, e.g., Somers v. Apple, Inc.,
729 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 2013); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 655 (noting that the “antitrust injury”
requirement applies to “virtually all of the antitrust laws”). It is for this reason that in developing a price
discrimination claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018), this Article characterizes
the prevention of resale in aid of price discrimination, rather than price discrimination itself, as the illicit
conduct that violates the Act. See infra note 22. That approach cannot be taken under the RobinsonPatman Act because the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination, but not the prevention of
arbitrage.
17
Legislatures have a long history of limiting price discrimination though prohibitions on “undue
discrimination” in pricing contained in rate regulatory regimes. See J. STEPHEN HENDERSON & ROBERT
E. BURNS, AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UNDUE PRICE DISCRIMINATION, NAT’L
REGULATORY RESEARCH INST. 26 (1989) (“One of the most nearly universal obligations imposed by
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Article shows how, by contrast, the courts might ban personalized pricing
without new legislation, by interpretation of the prohibition on
monopolization contained in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.18
The approach centers on a practice that is key to the viability of
personalized pricing: the prevention of arbitrage between low- and highprice units. Personalized pricing is possible only if those consumers charged
low prices by the firm are unable to resell the units they buy to those
consumers charged high prices by the firm.19 If resale is possible, then
resellers compete down the high prices and the price discrimination scheme
collapses.20 Preventing arbitrage is therefore key to the success of
personalized pricing. This Article shows that the prevention of arbitrage
counts as monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act because the
resellers shut down by the prevention of arbitrage are in effect competitors
of the firm, and the fact that shutting them down enables the firm to charge
higher prices to high-price buyers is direct evidence that the firm has
monopoly power. These two elements—anticompetitive conduct and
monopoly power—combine with the harm to consumers of personalized
pricing to make out a complete monopolization claim.21
The prevention of arbitrage is an example of what antitrust22 calls a
refusal to deal: the firm engaged in the personalizing of prices refuses to sell
units to low-price buyers who intend to resell the units to high-price
buyers.23 Antitrust has traditionally been wary of treating refusals to deal as
monopolization, even going so far as to recognize a general right of any firm
to choose with whom to do business and on what terms.24 But there are
exceptions, and the factors courts have relied upon to grant the exceptions
state and federal laws on public utilities is the obligation to serve at rates that are not unduly
discriminatory.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1070 (1988) (describing the earliest uses of federal power to
regulate discriminatory rates).
18
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
19
See KREPS, supra note 12, at 306.
20
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 626–27, 627 n. 7.
21
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). For an introduction to antitrust monopolization claims, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 193 (2d ed. 2001). Only arbitrage prevention in aid of personalized pricing
should be treated as monopolization, because consumer harm exists for certain only when prices are
personalized to equal the maximum that each consumer is willing to pay. See infra text accompanying
note 97.
22
“Antitrust” throughout this work means not only the antitrust laws of the United States, but also
the judges who apply them, the enforcers who enforce them, and the commentators who discuss them.
For an overview of the law, see POSNER, supra note 21, at 33–43. For an overview of enforcement, see
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 1025–26 (2d ed. 2008).
23
See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 317–22 (discussing the antitrust law of refusals to
deal).
24
See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407–8 (2004).
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apply to the prevention of arbitrage in personalized prices. Perhaps the
most important factor is whether the refusal amounts to the termination of a
prior profitable course of dealing, a termination that signals to the courts that
the refusal to deal was motivated by “dreams of monopoly.”26 This factor
weighs in favor of recognizing an exception to the right to refuse to deal for
arbitrage prevention, because a price-personalizing firm terminates a prior
profitable course of selling units to low-price buyers when the firm refuses
to sell additional units to low-price buyers who intend to resell them.27
Courts are loath to condemn refusals to deal because the natural remedy
for a refusal to deal is an order requiring the refuser to start selling to
competitors.28 Courts shrink from ordering such compelled dealing because
it requires courts to set the terms of sale, including price, a task the courts
believe they lack the expertise to carry out successfully.29 But rather than
remedy arbitrage prevention directly, by ordering dealing, courts can instead
attack the effects of arbitrage prevention, by ordering firms that prevent
arbitrage to cease personalizing prices.30 Such a non-personalization remedy
would preserve the discretion of the firm to set all the usual terms of dealing,
including price, subject only to the requirement of non-personalization. By
embracing non-personalization rather than compelled dealing as a remedy,
the courts would bring the remedy for arbitrage prevention within a core
judicial competency: the policing of discriminatory behavior.31
Indeed, the courts should not stop at condemning the prevention of
arbitrage as monopolization. They should treat the act of personalizing
prices itself, and not just the act of preventing arbitrage, as the trigger for
antitrust liability.32 Direct condemnation of personalized pricing is needed,
because personalized pricing always harms consumers, but firms need not
always take affirmative steps to prevent arbitrage in order to enable
personalized pricing, allowing some personalized pricing to escape the
antitrust dragnet if the prevention of arbitrage alone is the trigger for
liability. Sometimes consumers charged low prices will fail to avail
themselves of arbitrage opportunities, even when those opportunities are
available, whether out of laziness, incompetence, or a lack of interest in
profit.33 Condemnation of only arbitrage prevention is therefore
underinclusive, failing to preclude personalized pricing in all cases in which
25

See infra Section I.C.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
27
See infra text accompanying note 243.
28
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 339–40.
29
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08.
30
See infra Section I.C.4.ii.
31
See infra text accompanying note 293.
32
See infra Part II.
33
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945) (recognizing
that firms “may become monopolists by force of accident”).
26
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it is possible.
Fortunately, the courts in recent decades have shown flexibility in
adapting antitrust’s liability triggers to match the scope of the harm done to
consumers by anticompetitive conduct.34 Indeed, the courts in recent
decades have used antitrust’s consumer welfare standard severely to restrict
the set of conduct that can trigger liability, out of concern that much
formerly-illicit conduct is not actually harmful to consumers.35 By treating
personalized pricing as a stand-alone violation of the antitrust laws, the
courts can seize the opportunity to expand the set of conduct subject to
antitrust condemnation in an area in which all of that conduct is in fact
harmful to consumers.
The charging of different prices to different consumers is a natural part
of all economic activity: the cost of serving two consumers, even with
facially identical products, can differ substantially, due to transportation
costs, for example.36 The argument in this Article is not that a firm must
charge the same price for everything the firm sells, or face antitrust liability.
Cost-driven differences in price are good for consumers, ensuring that firms
can earn enough to engage in production, so cost-driven differences in price
cannot lead to antitrust liability.37 Rather, the argument here is that antitrust
can condemn personalized pricing, which is based on the maximum
willingness to pay of the consumer, rather than the cost of production of the
firm, because unlike cost-based pricing, personalized pricing always harms
consumers.38
To be precise, personalized pricing always harms consumers by design.
In practice, firms may never learn enough about consumers reliably to
identify each consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, and as a result
personalized pricing may in practice never succeed at extracting every last
penny of value from consumers.39 That would seem to undermine the
antitrust case against personalized pricing, because imperfectly-executed
personalized pricing does not have the characteristic of unambiguous harm
to consumers that is central to the antitrust case against personalized
pricing.40 If a firm fails to personalize a price equal to the maximum that
each consumer is willing to pay, then it is possible that the losses to
34

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
36
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 765–67.
37
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 11, at 7 (observing that pricing based on the cost of service “can improve economic
efficiency”).
38
See infra Section I.A.1.
39
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 769 (“Perfect price discrimination never exists in the real
world.”); HAL R. VARIAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION
29 (2004) (“In reality, price discrimination is never perfect[.]”).
40
For more on group-based pricing, see infra Section I.A.1.
35
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consumers charged higher prices may be offset by the non-zero surplus
enjoyed by consumers charged lower prices.
But that presents no real obstacle to the antitrust case against
personalized pricing, for antitrust liability has always been based on harm
by design, rather than actual harm. It has never been a defense to a claim of
monopolization that the bad actor did not in fact succeed at charging higher
prices to consumers and thereby at inflicting harm upon them.41 The
dominant firm that engages in anticompetitive conduct violates the Sherman
Act, whether in the event the firm succeeds at harming competition or not.42
What matters is that a monopolist has engaged in anticompetitive conduct
that could in theory give rise to harm, which is precisely what the prevention
of arbitrage in aid of personalized pricing constitutes.
This requirement of theoretical harm also explains why traditional, lowtech forms of personalized pricing, such as street-market haggling, would
not be swept up by antitrust condemnation of personalized pricing.43 To be
sure, the aim of these traditional forms is to raise price as high as possible,
but absent the use of technology—the employment of big data or computer
algorithms—they cannot possibly be aimed at identifying a determinate
maximum price that a consumer is willing to pay, and so lack the orientation
toward perfection, and therefore the theoretic consumer harm, that violates
the antitrust laws.44 The case against personalized pricing is a case against
an information-age practice, and is circumscribed accordingly.
Part I shows that personalized pricing supported by the prevention of
arbitrage constitutes monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, because the practice inflicts harm on consumers and
competition, and is always in itself direct evidence of monopoly power. In
particular, Section I.A shows that the prevention of arbitrage is
41
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 82 (observing that antitrust allows competitors injured by a
monopolist’s anticompetitive conduct to sue for lost profits even when consumers have not yet been
injured as a result of the harm to competition).
42
See id. at 882.
43
Cf. What Consumers–and Retailers–Should Know about Dynamic Pricing,
Knowledge@Wharton,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/what-consumers-and-retailersshould-know-about-dynamic-pricing/ (“‘Dynamic pricing has always been with us,’ says Wharton
marketing professor Peter Fader. ‘Think of the classic hagglers in the market of a Middle East bazaar.’”).
44
The bargaining that takes place in the context of bilateral monopoly—a market in which there is
but one buyer and one seller—would not run afoul of an antitrust rule against personalized pricing, even
if carried out with the aid of big data or computer algorithms, because there would be no separate lowand high-price buyers between whom the seller might prevent arbitrage. Attempts by sellers individually
to customize product offerings in order to characterize the market for each unit sold as a bilateral
monopoly market, and thereby to exploit this loophole, would fail, however, for the reasons set forth in
Section I.A.4. The antitrust ban on personalized pricing, regardless whether supported by affirmative
steps to prevent arbitrage, which is proposed in Part II, would, in any event, prevent the seller in a bilateral
monopoly from using big data or computer algorithms to charge the buyer the maximum that the buyer
is willing to pay for each unit purchased by the buyer as part of the negotiation. For more on this point,
see infra note 326.
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anticompetitive and harmful to consumers, and Section I.B shows that any
firm that personalizes prices must qualify as having monopoly power for
purposes of the antitrust laws. Section I.C shows that the right of a firm to
refuse to deal does not extend to the prevention of arbitrage in aid of
personalized pricing, and Section I.C.4.ii argues that the most administrable
remedy for personalized pricing is an order requiring non-discrimination,
rather than an order to cease the prevention of arbitrage. Part II argues that
the act of personalizing prices, regardless whether supported by the
prevention of arbitrage, should trigger antitrust liability.
I. ARBITRAGE PREVENTION AS MONOPOLIZATION
In order for a firm to engage in monopolization in violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act, the firm must (1) engage in anticompetitive conduct,
meaning behavior that both harms consumers and causes the market to
deviate from the perfectly competitive ideal, and (2) have monopoly power,
meaning that the firm must have the power profitably to raise its prices above
some measure of its costs.45 A firm that engages in personalized pricing will
usually meet both criteria.46
A. Anticompetitive Conduct
1. Personalized Pricing Harms Consumers
Personalized pricing satisfies the consumer harm requirement, because
the charging of a price equal to the maximum that a consumer is willing to
pay ensures that the consumer derives a vanishingly small benefit from the
transaction.47 The total gain from trade between the firm and the consumer
is the benefit conferred by the product on the consumer—measured by the
maximum price that the consumer is willing to pay for the product—less the
harm suffered by the firm to produce the product—measured by the firm’s
production costs, including the cost of providing investors with a reasonable
return on investment.48 The price the firm charges for the product splits the
gain from trade, by forcing the consumer to compensate the firm for its
production costs and, if the price exceeds those production costs, to pay out
to the firm some of the additional benefit conferred by the product on the
45

See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
at 292. The monopoly power requirement is also sometimes called the “market power” or “dominance”
requirement. Compare id. at 292–93 (market power), with GAVIL ET AL., supra note 22, at 583
(monopoly, dominance).
46
The exception is when arbitrage fails to take place even though the firm has taken no steps to
prevent it, and the firm is therefore able to personalize prices without engaging in anticompetitive
conduct. See infra Part II.
47
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 446.
48
See id. at 251, 260, 409–10.
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49

consumer. It follows that a price personalized to equal the consumer’s
maximum willingness to pay forces the consumer to pay out the entire gain
from trade to the firm.50 In practice, firms will personalize prices equal to a
vanishingly small amount less than the maximum the consumer is willing to
pay. When the price equals the maximum that the consumer is willing to
pay, the consumer is technically indifferent between buying and not buying
at all, because the price just equals the value the consumer places on the
product. Firms set prices slightly below maximum willingness to pay in
order to be sure that consumers will buy.51 But the infinitesimal gain to
consumers from being induced to buy might as well be zero.52 Personalizing
prices has the extraordinary characteristic of charging consumers prices so
high that consumers are rendered no better off—more or less—than if they
had made no purchases at all.53
For example, if the maximum a consumer is willing to pay for a Coke is
$2.51, and Coca-Cola spends $0.25 to produce a Coke, then the gains from
trade with the consumer are $2.26. If Coca-Cola personalizes a price equal
to $2.50 to the consumer—a penny below the consumer’s maximum
willingness to pay, in order to ensure that the consumer will buy—then
Coca-Cola takes virtually all of the gains from trade, or $2.25, because CocaCola generates $2.50 in revenues less Coca-Cola’s $0.25 production cost.
The consumer still buys, because at $2.50 the price does not exceed the
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, but the consumer’s gain of one
penny from buying the Coke is very small. By contrast, if Coca-Cola were
to charge $0.26 for a Coke, which is a price at which Coca-Cola will produce
and sell Coke because it affords Coke a profit of one penny, the consumer
would enjoy a net gain from the transaction of $2.25. That is the value the
consumer places on the Coke of $2.51, less the purchase price of $0.26. The
consumer would therefore capture virtually all of the gains available from
trade. The margin between the cost of production and the maximum the
consumer is willing to pay is called surplus, the difference between price
and cost is the firm’s share of that surplus, also called profit, and the
difference between the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay and price
is the consumer’s share of the surplus, also called consumer surplus. By
49
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 6 (showing how producer and consumer surplus are determined
by the price charged).
50
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 446.
51
See id. at 10–109, 446 (observing that at a consumer’s reservation price, the consumer is
indifferent between buying and not buying); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 497 (4th ed. 1977) (“[E]very consumer gets out of each transaction something
more than he pays for the item he purchases. This must be so because no one forces him to make a
purchase.” (emphasis omitted)).
52
See AMIR ALEXANDER, INFINITESIMAL 9 (2014) (observing that it is a paradox of the vanishingly
small that it at once has magnitude and its “size is zero”).
53
See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1390.
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driving price up almost to willingness to pay, personalized pricing
guarantees that the firm captures virtually the entire gain from trade as
profits, and drives consumer surplus as close to zero as possible.54
Without personalized pricing, consumers always have a chance of
capturing some of the gain from trade, and consequently the imposition of
personalized pricing harms consumers, by eliminating their access to that
gain.55 In the absence of personalized pricing, firms can at best charge groupbased, rather than personalized, prices, and group-based prices always leave
some consumers with a gain from trade, because a group-based price must
be the same for all members of the group.56 Unless the profit-maximizing
price to charge to the group happens to be the price that only the highestmaximum-willingness-to-pay member is willing to pay—and that will not
be the case if the gain to the firm from selling to an additional group member
exceeds the loss from reducing price to the highest-maximum-willingnessto-pay member that will not be the case—the uniform price charged to the
group must be below the maximum willingness to pay of at least one group
member, and possibly more.57 Those lucky group members who pay a price
below the maximum they are willing to pay—known as “inframarginal”
consumers—enjoy a consumer surplus. Only the lowest-maximumwillingness-to-pay member of the group among those to whom the firm
sells—called the “marginal” consumer—pays a price equal to the
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay and therefore enjoys no consumer
surplus. When firms switch to personalized pricing, the consumer surpluses
available to all but the marginal consumer under group-based pricing go
away, and so consumers are harmed.58
The extent of the harm inflicted by personalized pricing depends,
however, on the prevailing level of competition between substitute products
in the market.59 For the maximum willingness of each consumer to pay for
a product always depends on the value the consumer places on the

54

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 6, 769.
See Stole, supra note 12, at 3–4, 6 (observing that under second- and third-degree price
discrimination consumers can retain some surplus). This point is discussed in greater depth infra in the
text accompanying note 86.
56
See id. at 3–4.
57
See id. at 4 (observing that if there is some “heterogeneity [in the preferences of group members,]
third-degree price discrimination will leave some consumer surplus”).
58
To be sure, a firm will price some consumers out of the market under group-based pricing if
lowering the group’s price to meet their maximum willingness to pay does not result in a gain for the
firm that offsets the lost revenue from selling to the group’s inframarginal consumers at a lower price.
But, as discussed more fully below, those consumers who are priced out of the market would enjoy only
a vanishingly small consumer surplus under personalized pricing, so the switch to personalized pricing
confers virtually no gain upon them. See infra Section I.A.2.
59
See Stole, supra note 12, at 6–8.
55
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alternative products offered by the firm’s competitors. Personalized
pricing allows firms to raise prices up to the maxima that consumers are
willing to pay, but the level of competition in the market—the appeal of
competing products to consumers and the prices charged by their makers—
determines how high or low a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for
the firm’s product will be.61 Cola buyers, for example, may prefer Coke to
Pepsi, and be willing to pay a quarter or two more for a Coke than a Pepsi,
but if Coke raises prices by more than, say, fifty cents, those buyers will buy
Pepsi instead. By contrast, if there were no alternative to Coke on the market,
those buyers would likely be willing to put up with greater price increases—
perhaps a dollar or two—before eventually giving up on the purchase of cola
altogether and buying cheaper, but less preferred, substitutes, like water.
Personalized pricing will therefore extract more value from Coke buyers in
a cola market monopolized by Coke than it will in a market contested by
Pepsi, because without Pepsi as a backstop, consumers have more to gain
from trade with Coke, and Coke therefore has more gain to extract through
personalized pricing.
The relationship between competition and maximum willingness to pay
means that the harm inflicted by personalized pricing on consumers can be
tempered by making markets more competitive.62 But it does not mean that
in some, more competitive, markets the adoption of personalized pricing
cannot harm consumers at all, whereas only in other, less competitive,
markets will personalized pricing inflict harm. So long as competitors sell
differentiated products, each product will have its loyalists—those willing
to pay more for the product than others—and that will allow firms to use
personalized pricing to eliminate the consumer surpluses their loyalists
enjoy under group-based pricing.63 The more competitive the market, the
less profit the firm will be able to extract via personalized pricing, because
consumers’ loyalties will be weaker, but the opportunity to extract more
profit—and to harm consumers—by adopting personalized pricing will

60
See id. at 7 (“[C]onsumers may . . . obtain considerable non-residual surplus from the presence
of competition.”).
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A REORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 67 (7th ed. 1956) (“As long as the substitutes are to any degree
imperfect, he still has a monopoly of his own product and control over its price within the limits imposed
upon any monopolist — those of the demand.”); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 131–32, 623 (“If a price
discrimination scheme is profitable at least some purchasers will be paying more than marginal cost for
the product, and this necessitates at least a modest amount of market power as to them. However, . . . the
amount of market power need not be great and often is no more than that which results from product
differentiation . . . . For example, even tiny airlines in intense competition with larger rivals price
discriminate in filling their seats. They charge widely different prices to different classes of passengers
notwithstanding that the cost of serving them is roughly the same.”).
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never go away. Personalized pricing is therefore always, inherently,
harmful to consumers, regardless the level of competition in markets.65
64

See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 67; HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 131–32, 623.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 627 (“All forms of persistent price discrimination transfer
wealth away from consumers and toward sellers. If antitrust policy is concerned with such wealth
transfers, then price discrimination presents an antitrust problem.”). Sometimes, personalized pricing can
itself trigger additional competition that may counteract personalized pricing’s harmful effects on
consumers. See Stole, supra note 12, at 7.
For example, consider the following competitive market, initially without personalized pricing.
Suppose that in this market a consumer places a $6 value on a box of a particular brand of cookie, and
that the current price is $2. Suppose, further, that the consumer places a $5 value on a competing brand
of cookie, which also happens to retail at a price of $2. The maker of the second box of cookies might
well know that the consumer will buy the first box, because the surplus the consumer derives from
purchasing the first box ($6 less the price of $2) exceeds the surplus the consumer derives from
purchasing the second box ($5 less the price of $2), but if the maker of the second box must charge
uniform prices, at least to certain groups of consumers, the maker of the second box may be unable to
compete for the consumer’s business. Lowering the price of the box to $0.50, which would induce the
consumer to buy from the second maker (because now the consumer’s surplus of $4.50 would exceed
the $4 of surplus associated with purchase of cookies from the first maker), might force the second maker
to reduce output, because although the cost to the second maker of producing a box for this consumer
might only be $0.25, the cost of producing boxes of cookies for others might be $1.50, and a new uniform
price of $0.50 would make production of those units unprofitable. Overall, the decline in output might
reduce profits, even if it permitted sale of one new box of cookies to this particular consumer.
But now suppose that personalized pricing is possible. The second maker could lower the price
charged for the particular box sold to the consumer down to $0.50, but keep the prices the firm charges
for other boxes up above their production cost of $1.50, ensuring that the firm would not be forced to
reduce output and overall profits in order to compete for the consumer’s business. If the first maker were
to personalize prices as well, and therefore would not need to reduce prices on all units in order to reduce
the price charged to the consumer for a box of cookies, then the first maker would respond to the price
cut by the second maker with a price cut of its own, perhaps down to $1.25 (assuming that the first
maker’s cost of production of the particular box of cookies that the first maker wishes to sell to the
consumer, like the second maker’s cost, is only $0.25). The second maker now could not respond with
an additional price cut, because to confer on the consumer a greater surplus than what the consumer
would get from purchasing the first box at $1.25, the second maker would need to charge a price below
the second maker’s production cost of $0.25, making an additional price cut unprofitable. But the
consumer would nevertheless have benefitted from the advent of personalized pricing in this competitive
market, because the competition made possible by personalized pricing would have driven the price paid
by the consumer for the first box down from $2 to $1.25.
(Absent such competitive effects, the harm of personalized pricing to consumers is of course
straightforward, because then personalized pricing leads only to a raising of prices up to each consumer’s
maximum willingness to pay. Suppose that, to keep the consumer from buying cookies from the second
maker, the first maker under uniform pricing had been unable to raise the uniform cookie price above $2
for the firm’s other customers, even though those customers value a box of cookies at $10 and would
therefore be willing to pay up to $7 before preferring to buy the second maker’s cookies (which these
customers value at $5) at a price of $2. Personalized pricing would allow the first maker to raise price to
$7 for its other customers, without raising price to the consumer who only places a value of $6 on the
cookies. Those other customers are therefore badly harmed by the advent of personalized pricing.
Moreover, if the second maker is unable to lower prices—even with personalized pricing technology—
because the second maker’s production costs for all units is $2, for example, instead of $0.25 or $1.50,
then there will be no personalized price competition to sell to the consumer that might offset the harm
caused by the charging of higher prices to other customers.)
The fact that the introduction of personalized pricing could increase the level of competition in the
market, and that increase might result in a partial or complete offset of the consumer-harmful effects of
65
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2. The Principal Economic Defenses of Price Discrimination Ignore
the Harmfulness of Personalized Pricing to Consumers
This result contrasts with the generally favorable way in which
economists treat personalized pricing, a contrast that has three sources. First,
when economists celebrate personalized pricing, they celebrate not the
effects of personalized pricing on consumers, but the effects of personalized
pricing on overall surplus, inclusive of both firm profits and consumer
surplus, which is sometimes called total surplus.66 Firms that do not
personalize prices charge group-based prices instead, meaning different
prices to different groups of consumers, but uniform prices to all consumers
within a given group. In an effort to raise prices to consumers in a particular
group who are willing to pay more, firms may charge within-group uniform
personalized pricing, cannot, however, serve as the basis for an argument that personalized pricing can
be good for consumers. For at the new level of competition created by personalized pricing, each firm
will use personalized pricing to charge the highest possible prices—given the new, more competitive
environment—to consumers. And that in turn means that personalized pricing minimizes the benefit to
consumers of whatever greater level of competition personalized pricing makes possible. That in turn
means that consumers are better off achieving any given level of competition through a combination of
uniform pricing and greater antitrust enforcement aimed at improving the overall competitive dynamic
in the market, than through the application of personalized pricing.
In other words, if personalized pricing happens to promote competition, the first cookie maker will
charge $1.25 after competing on personalized prices with the second cookie maker, not the $1.00, or even
$0.25, that the first maker could afford to charge given its costs. And personalized pricing will allow the
first maker to maintain that $1.25 price even if the firm must charge lower prices to other customers to
compete for their business against different rivals. Compare that to a world in which, starting with the
original uniform prices charged by the cookie makers, antitrust authorities were to promote competition
in the market, perhaps by compelling the first maker to disclose its secret recipe to competitors and
forcing the first maker to turn its production facilities into an open platform. The second maker, whose
inferior recipe was only valued at $5 by the consumer, and whose production costs on some units were
as high as $1.50, in excess of the $0.25 cost of production of the first firm, could now produce cookies
with a $6 value to the consumer (and with an even greater value to others) at the same cost as the first
firm. Because now the second firm would be offering a product that the first firm’s customers value as
highly as the first firm’s product, competition would drive the uniform price of the cookies sold by both
firms down to production cost of $0.25, and because prices would be uniform, all customers would gain,
making consumers as a group much better off than under the competition that arrives incidental to the
adoption of personalized pricing.
Personalized pricing may have procompetitive effects, but whatever level of competition
personalized pricing may make possible, personalized pricing always ensures that consumers enjoy the
smallest possible benefit from that level of competition. Which is why, for any given level of competition,
the use of personalized pricing instead of uniform pricing inflicts an unambiguous harm on consumers.
For an additional example, and elaboration upon this point, see Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Sixth and
Seventh of the FTC’s Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, and
Specifically, How Algorithmic and Data-Driven Pricing Exacerbate The Consumer Harm Associated
with Market Power and Give the FTC a Mandate to More Vigorously Enforce the Antitrust Laws, The
Seventh Session of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings on Competition and Consumer
Protection
in
the
21st
Century
4–5
(Jan.
7,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2019/01/ftc-2018-0101-d-0007163726.pdf.
66
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 21, at 80 n.37; VARIAN, supra note 11, at 445–47.
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prices that price low-willingness-to-pay consumers out of the market
entirely, even when those low-willingness-to-pay consumers would be
willing to pay prices that cover the costs of producing the product for them.67
An airline charging a uniform price to the group consisting of last-minute
fliers prefers to let some seats go unfilled, for example, even though the
marginal cost of providing access to those remaining seats is near zero, in
order to charge a higher price to the last-minute fliers who do still buy at
higher prices.68 That reduces total surplus, by precluding purchases by fliers
who have a low willingness to pay, but who are nevertheless willing to pay
more than the costs of production.69 Economists celebrate personalized
pricing because the practice breaks this tradeoff between profits and total
surplus.70 Personalized pricing allows firms to charge high prices to those
with a high willingness to pay and low prices to those with a low willingness
to pay, allowing the firm to profit without pricing low-willingness-to-pay
consumers out of the market and therefore without reducing total surplus.71
While personalized pricing may produce more total surplus than does
group-based pricing, personalized pricing does not, however, produce more
consumer surplus than does group-based pricing. Indeed, personalized
67

See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 429–33.
See Lucinda Shen, We Asked the Experts: Is It Cheaper to Book a Flight Last Minute?, MONEY
(Aug. 3, 2017), http://money.com/money/4868436/are-flights-cheaper-last-minute/.
69
The reduction in total welfare is sometimes called “deadweight loss.” See HOVENKAMP, supra
note 1, at 20, 86.
70
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 445–47.
71
See id. Economists recognize, however, that personalized pricing can induce firms to overinvest
in product development in pursuit of the greater profits associated with the personalized pricing of a
product relative to the uniform pricing of the product, and that this overinvestment can reduce total
surplus, by converting some of that surplus into increased, and unnecessary, research and development
costs. See Vincenzo Denicolò, Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?, 22 ECON. POL’Y 680, 690
(2007) (modeling the relationship between expected profits and research and development expenditure).
By increasing profits, personalized pricing may also cause firms to waste resources, and reduce total
surplus, in trying to harm sellers of competing substitute products in order to protect those higher profits.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 772–73. These problems temper the positive effect of personalized
pricing on total surplus. A further tempering effect comes from the cost of implementing and maintaining
personalized pricing itself. The acquisition and analysis of consumer data, not to mention the creation of
an information technology infrastructure that permits the delivery of personalized prices to consumers,
are all necessary to implement personalized pricing, and these are costly, further reducing total surplus.
Economists also recognize that price discrimination can impose search costs on consumers, as
consumers seek to avoid the high end of the firm’s pricing schedule and to find units sold by the firm at
the low end of that schedule. See Varian, supra note 4, at 33. These costs reduce total surplus. There
should be no search costs associated with the peculiar form of price discrimination that is personalized
pricing, however, because the firm’s ability accurately to identify each consumer and charge that
consumer a personalized price implies that consumers will be unable to take steps to escape the prices
personalized to them and so will not waste resources attempting to do so. But to the extent that firms’
technology is imperfect, and they succeed only at approximating personalized pricing, there may be scope
for consumers to take steps to confuse personalized pricing systems—and obtain lower prices thereby—
and the resources that consumers expend on doing so would count as a cost of personalized pricing and
would therefore further reduce total surplus.
68
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pricing drives consumer surplus almost to zero. Because consumer surplus,
and not total surplus, matters to antitrust, economists’ ardor for the totalsurplus-expanding effects of personalized pricing is quite irrelevant to
antitrust policy and obscures the conflict between personalized pricing and
antitrust’s mission to protect consumer welfare.72 The aim of personalized
pricing is to set the prices charged to all buyers, including low-willingnessto-pay buyers, as close as possible to the maximum that each buyer is willing
to pay, ensuring that the surplus enjoyed by each buyer, including any lowwillingness-to-pay buyer who is able for the first time to buy as a result of
the personalization, is nearly zero.73 However much personalized pricing
may expand total surplus, personalized pricing ensures that the entire
expansion in surplus goes to firms in the form of profits, along with any
share of the existing surplus that consumers would have enjoyed under
group-based pricing. To return to the airfare example, personalized pricing
fills every last seat on the plane, in stark contrast to group-based pricing, but
each passenger pays such a high personalized price that each passenger feels
that the price is so high that the trip is very nearly not worthwhile. That is
true no matter how urgent the passenger’s need to travel, because
personalized prices adjust to reflect the urgency that each passenger places
on the trip. Because antitrust’s mission is to protect consumer surplus, not
total surplus, a practice that increases the gains from trade, but allows only
firms, and not consumers, to capture those gains, merits no antitrust
deference. 74
The second source of the generally favorable treatment of personalized
pricing by economists is the belief of some economists that the greater
ability to extract value from consumers made possible by personalized
pricing may be necessary to allow firms to cover their costs of production,
particularly large fixed costs.75 This cost-coverage view is closely related to
the view, just discussed, that personalized pricing permits firms to sell to
buyers who might otherwise be priced out of the market.76 According to the
72

See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1389–90; HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 769 (“[F]irst degree
price discrimination is often said to be as efficient as perfect competition, even though one result of
perfect price discrimination is that customers are far poorer and the seller far richer.”).
73
See supra Section I.A.1.
74
See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 196 (2008); Steven C. Salop,
Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare
Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 336–38 (2010).
75
See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The
opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period— is what attracts ‘business acumen’
in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”); Jonathan B.
Baker, Evaluating Appropriability Defenses for the Exclusionary Conduct of Dominant Firms in
Innovative Industries, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 435–38 (2016) (discussing the relevant economic
literature) (sources cited therein).
76
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 769.
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cost-coverage view, firms with very high fixed costs may not be able to
generate enough revenue through group-based pricing in order to cover their
costs.77 Personalized pricing provides a solution, the argument goes, by
allowing the firm both to extract additional revenues from inframarginal
consumers and to bring more consumers into the market and extract further
revenues from them as well.78
The trouble with this view is that it is not clear that group-based pricing
is actually unable to cover all the fixed costs of production.79 The assumption
that group-based pricing cannot cover costs implies that the economy as it
exists today, on the eve of the personalization of prices, is under-investing
in production.80 But there is no reason to suppose that is so.81 Preventing
personalized pricing from spreading across the economy would not reduce
the revenues available to firms to cover costs, but only prevent an expansion
in those revenues.82 To defend personalized pricing on cost-coverage
grounds therefore requires an argument in favor of expanding the revenues
available to firms relative to current levels, an argument that has not for the
most part been made.83
The third source of the generally favorable treatment of personalized
pricing by economists is that economists usually mean imperfect, or thirddegree, price discrimination when they celebrate personalized pricing, rather
than true personalized pricing, which economists call first-degree, or perfect,
price discrimination.84 Third-degree price discrimination, which is almost
universal today, is group-based pricing: the division of consumers into
groups and the charging of uniform prices tailored to extract the maximum
profit from each group.85 Economists like third-degree price discrimination
77
See Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Price Discrimination and Product Differentiation in Economic
Theory: An Early Analysis, 84 Q.J. ECON. 268, 269–70 (1970).
78
See id.
79
See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1402–03.
80
See id.
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
But see William D. Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and
Measurement, Working Paper No. 10433 22 (2004) (concluding that only 2.8% of gains from innovation
are captured by firms); Denicolò, supra note 71, at 712–13 (suggesting that patents under-reward
innovators).
84
See Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust
Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 612 (2003).
85
See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 279 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) (4th ed. 1932)
(“A third degree would obtain if the monopolist were able to distinguish among his customers n different
groups, separated from one another more or less by some practicable mark, and could charge a separate
monopoly price to the members of each group.” (emphasis omitted)). For the prevalence of third-degree
price discrimination, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 767 (“Sporadic price discrimination is an
everyday occurrence in competitive markets.”); Varian, supra note 4, at 3 (describing third-degree price
discrimination as “perhaps the most common form of price discrimination; examples are student
discounts, or charging different prices on different days of the week”). This prevalence is particularly
clear given that second-degree price discrimination should count as a form of third-degree price
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because it has the potential to increase consumer surplus relative to uniform
pricing across all consumers of a product.86 Suppose, for example, that a
firm becomes able to segment its market into two groups of consumers:
those who currently buy at the prevailing uniform price and those who are
willing to pay the cost of producing additional units of the product but who
cannot afford to buy the product at the prevailing price. The firm might then
start to charge two prices, the old price to existing customers, and a new
lower price to low-willingness-to-pay customers designed to induce some of
them to start buying the product. Because, in a third-degree-pricediscrimination scheme, the firm will charge the new lower price uniformly
to all the members of the low-willingness-to-pay group, some inframarginal
consumers within that group will enjoy a consumer surplus at that new lower
price.87 Because the existing consumers continue to pay the same price as
before, their consumer surplus will not change, and so the aggregate
consumer surplus enjoyed by all consumers will increase thanks to
implementation of the third-degree price discrimination scheme. Of course,
the firm may find it profitable to take advantage of the firm’s power to
segment high-willingness-to-pay consumers into a separate group to raise
the price charged to that group, instead of keeping it unchanged.88 That
would drive some high-willingness-to-pay consumers out of the market,
eliminating their consumer surplus, and would further reduce the consumer
surplus of the inframarginal high-willingness-to-pay consumers who remain
in the market.89 These consumer surplus reductions might offset the gains in
consumer surplus associated with the lower price charged to lowwillingness-to-pay consumers.90 But gains remain possible, making
economists reluctant to condemn third-degree price discrimination out of

discrimination. Second-degree price discrimination is a seller’s structuring of a product or price schedule
to induce consumers to self-sort based on willingness to pay. See Stole, supra note 12, at 4. It ought to
be treated as a subcategory of third-degree price discrimination because the self-sorting induced by the
practice results in group-based pricing. The only difference between second-degree price discrimination
and archetypical third-degree price discrimination is that in second-degree price discrimination the price
charged, or product offered, to group members is constrained by the need to use the price or product as
a sorting mechanism.
86
See Klein & Wiley, supra note 84, at 612. This point is also discussed briefly supra in the text
accompanying note 55 .
87
See Kathleen Carroll & Dennis Coates, Teaching Price Discrimination: Some Clarification, 66
S. ECON. J. 466, 472 (1999) (stating that under third-degree price discrimination “the group members
will derive consumer surplus . . . that the firm cannot extract”); Varian, supra note 4, at 3 (observing that
under third-degree price discrimination within-group prices are constant). For the definition of
inframarginal consumers, see supra text accompanying note 57.
88
See Klein & Wiley, supra note 84, at 612.
89
See id.
90
See Carroll & Coates, supra note 87, at 472–73 (stating that third-degree price discrimination
may be “not only less efficient than first-degree price discrimination, it is also less efficient than no price
discrimination”).
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91

hand.
Personalized pricing lacks third-degree price discrimination’s potential
to benefit consumers because under personalized pricing low-willingnessto-pay consumers who are brought into the market for the first time by the
personalization of prices enjoy almost no consumer surplus. Firms
personalize prices as close as possible to the maximum willingness to pay of
each consumer, including the low-willingness-to-pay consumer who is
priced into the market, and so personalized pricing generates no gains for
new, low-willingness-to-pay consumers with which to offset the losses of
inframarginal consumers who would have bought at a non-personalized
price.92 Under personalized pricing, all consumers pay the highest possible
prices and enjoy almost no consumer surplus.93 As advances in information
technology allow firms to segment consumers and their purchases into
increasingly small groups, the third-degree price discrimination prevalent
today will come increasingly to resemble personalized pricing.94 At each
step, consumer surplus may rise, or fall, because the effects of third-degree
price discrimination are ambiguous, but at the last step, from a uniform price
charged across two purchases to a unique price charged for a single purchase
alone, consumer surplus must fall, and fall to zero.95 That step, from a world
of group-based, uniform pricing, to personalized pricing, unambiguously
harms consumers.96
To ensure that in hastening to condemn personalized pricing antitrust
does not preclude third-degree price discrimination, and its potential benefits
to consumers, courts must require plaintiffs challenging personalized pricing
under Section 2 to prove that the defendant is personalizing prices to
individual consumers on a unit basis.97 In general, evidence of
91

See Klein & Wiley, supra note 84, at 612.
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 445–47.
93
See supra Section I.A.1.
94
See Niejadlik, supra note 6, at 3 (“Rather than relying on static product bundles at pre-determined
prices, we envision a system that develops a customized offer at the right price for each customer. To
realize this vision, fundamental changes are necessary in the way we approach pricing, revenue
management, and merchandizing. These systems must move beyond industry constraints and rigid data
silos to become more flexible and utilize new technologies to be successful.”).
95
For the effect of personalized pricing on consumer surplus, see supra Section I.A.1. Third-degree
price discrimination transforms into personalized pricing only once firms are able to segment consumers
into groups of one for each individual unit purchased by the consumer and to charge a personalized price
for each such unit. If each consumer buys only one unit of a particular good, prices for that good are
personalized once firms succeed at segmenting consumers into groups of one. When consumers buy
multiple units of a particular good, however, personalized pricing exists only if each consumer is charged
the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for each unit that the consumer buys. See Klein & Wiley,
supra note 84, at 612. In this multiple-unit-per-individual-consumer context, segmenting consumers into
groups of one will not be enough to achieve personalized pricing, so long as the consumer is still charged
a uniform price for all units that the consumer purchases.
96
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 445–47.
97
For the significance of personalizing prices for each unit sold, see supra note 95.
92
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personalization will not be hard to find in cases in which the activity is
genuinely taking place. Personalized pricing requires the use of information
technology to identify the consumer at the point of sale and the use of
datasets to determine the consumer’s reservation prices.98 This requires a
substantial infrastructure that is difficult to hide.99 Personalization can also
be inferred from data on the actual prices charged by a firm for different
units of the same product.100
Additional proof that the defendant is tailoring prices to the maximum
that consumers are willing to pay, as opposed to some more equitable price
level, should not be required, however, because any profit-maximizing firm
will seek to charge the highest possible prices, and when prices are set on a
personalized basis, the highest possible prices are the maximum prices that
consumers are willing to pay.101 Of course, in the absence of perfect
information on consumers, firms will fail always to charge the absolute
maximum that each consumer is willing to pay, but the fact that a firm has
chosen to charge a personalized price for each unit is evidence that the firm’s
goal is to charge a price equal to the consumer’s willingness to pay and
therefore evidence enough of consumer-harmful conduct for antitrust
purposes.102
3. Arbitrage Prevention Harms Competition
There is a long and perhaps legitimate tradition in antitrust, and
economics more generally, of thinking of price as a byproduct of the level
98
For an example of the data and econometric methods required to attempt personalized pricing,
see BENJAMIN REED SHILLER, FIRST-DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION USING BIG DATA 1–4 (Apr. 9,
2014)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://benjaminshiller.com/images/First_Degree_PD_Using_Big_Data_Apr_8,_2014.pdf;
Niejadlik,
supra note 6, at 11 (observing that personalized pricing will require “new advances and techniques in
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning” as well as “massive amounts of historical behavioral
data”).
99
See Lynn DeLain & Edward O’Meara, Building a Business Case for Revenue Management, 2 J.
REVENUE & PRICING MGMT. 368, 370 (2004) (discussing the systems required for implementing a
“revenue management” system of the kind used by the hospitality industry and estimating costs as
ranging from $3 million to $10 million in the first two years).
100
Of course, any differences would have to be adjusted for differences in production cost. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 765 (“[T]echnically, two sales are discriminatory when they have different
ratios of price to marginal cost.”). But in some cases, such as when consumers buy multiple units of a
good at the same time, cost differences can be presumed small and information on unit-by-unit price
differences may be sufficient for an inference of personalized pricing.
101
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 446. Antitrust makes a similar assumption about the height of the
uniform prices charged by cartels and monopolies. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 57
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]f monopoly power has been acquired or maintained through improper means, the
fact that the power has not been used to extract [a monopoly price] provides no succor to the monopolist.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222–23
(1940) (declaring “immaterial” to a price fixing violation whether prices were “fixed at the fair going
market price”).
102
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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of competition in markets, rather than as a cause. According to this view,
competition constrains prices, not the other way around, and so it follows
that a mere pricing practice, such as personalized pricing, cannot harm
competition (with notable exceptions not relevant here).104 If a pricing
practice harms consumers, the argument goes, that can only be because
competition is failing to drive prices down, and if antitrust wishes to solve
the problem, antitrust must target any anticompetitive practices that have
undermined competition, rather than the pricing practice itself.105 According
to this view, antitrust should treat the competitive disease, not the pricing
symptom. This view precludes a monopolization claim targeting
personalized pricing itself, but does not prevent a monopolization claim
targeting the underlying anticompetitive practice that makes personalized
pricing possible.106
That underlying anticompetitive practice is the prevention of
arbitrage.107 In order for personalized pricing to work, the firm must be able
to prevent low-willingness-to-pay consumers, to whom the firm charges low
prices, from making profits by reselling the units they buy from the firm at
low prices to consumers who are willing to pay high prices and who would
otherwise buy at high personalized prices directly from the firm.108 By
charging these “high-price consumers” only very slightly less than the high
prices that the firm would personalize to them, the “low-price consumers”
engaged in resale can induce high-price consumers to buy resold units, rather
than units sold directly by the firm, while still earning a profit.109 If the firm
fails to prevent this “arbitrage” of its personalized prices, then high-price
103

See POSNER, supra note 21, at 113–15.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 322 (“Antitrust . . . is designed to be a market alternative to
price regulation, not merely price regulation by another name.”). The most notable exception is belowcost, also known as predatory, pricing. See generally id. at 370–410 (discussing “predatory and other
exclusionary pricing”).
105
See POSNER, supra note 21, at 114 (arguing that if “exclusionary practices” are the cause of
“supracompetitive prices” then “the practices can be enjoined or punished”).
106
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 316 (“Most price discrimination is concerned with extraction,
not exclusion. That is, its purpose and generally its effect is not to exclude anyone from the market, but
rather to enable a seller to earn higher profits . . . .”). Price discrimination has been treated as in itself
anticompetitive conduct at least once, in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), but the anticompetitive effects at issue in that case
are distinct from the effects of personalized pricing that are the subject of this Article. See infra text
accompanying note 226. For the argument that antitrust should treat the personalization of prices itself
as a standalone violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, though not as a violation of Section 2’s
prohibition on monopolization, see infra Part II.
107
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 148 (“[A]rbitrage occurs when the buyers who pay a low
price resell the product to buyers asked to pay a high price. If the monopolist cannot prevent arbitrage,
then price discrimination may not work.”); Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price Discrimination and
Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259, 1260 (1990) (stating that “with perfect
arbitrage, of course, price discrimination would be impossible”).
108
See KREPS, supra note 12, at 306.
109
See POSNER, supra note 21, at 83.
104
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consumers will not buy from the firm, but instead from low-price consumers
acting as resellers.110 All consumer demand will be satisfied through sales of
the firm’s product to low-price consumers, part of which product will be
consumed by low-price consumers and part resold to high-price
consumers.111 The firm will therefore effectively find itself selling its entire
inventory at the lowest price the firm personalizes to consumers, and will
therefore give up on personalized pricing and revert to uniform pricing,
which will allow the firm to choose a higher uniform price at which to sell
its product.112 The firm cannot prevent arbitrage simply by refusing to sell
at all to low-price consumers, because then the firm would sell the product
only at the high price to high-price consumers, and the firm would then no
longer be engaged in personalized pricing.113 The only way for the firm to
prevent arbitrage is to sell at the low price to low-price consumers only in
an amount equal to the low-price consumers’ personal needs and to refuse
to sell any additional units that low-price consumers might use for resale.
This refusal of the firm to permit low-price consumers to buy for the purpose
of resale is the anticompetitive conduct that brings personalized pricing
within the ambit of the antitrust laws.114
Personalized pricing itself in fact constitutes a refusal to sell to low-price
consumers for resale, making personalized pricing at once a symptom of
competitive disease and the disease itself.115 Personalized pricing amounts
to a refusal to sell for resale because truly personalized prices must
automatically adjust upward to account for a buyer’s intent to resell a unit,
depriving the buyer of the ability to profit from resale and thereby effectively
denying the buyer access to the good for resale purposes. Personalized prices
adjust upward when a buyer intends to use a good for resale, as opposed to
personal consumption, because a buyer’s willingness to pay for goods that
the buyer intends to resell must include the amount of the profit that the
buyer will make from resale. Because firms personalize prices to equal each
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for each unit the consumer
purchases, the personalized price a firm charges to a buyer who intends to
110

See KREPS, supra note 12, at 306.
See Carroll & Coates, supra note 87, at 474–75.
112
See id. Under personalized pricing with arbitrage, not only will the firm sell its entire inventory
at a low price, but all buyers will also buy at that price, so long as resellers compete heavily against each
other in reselling to high-price buyers. If there are resale costs, however, then price will not be driven all
the way down to that low price, but only down to a price that includes both that low price and those resale
costs. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 627 (discussing the cost of resale). Regardless the price paid by
buyers, under personalized pricing with arbitrage the firm will always earn a price equal to the price it
charges to low-price consumers, because those low-price consumers will buy up the firm’s entire
inventory at the low price personalized to them.
113
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 148.
114
See POSNER, supra note 21, at 234 n.62 (“recognizing that the prevention of arbitrage . . . could
be regarded as exclusionary . . . from the standpoint of secondhand dealers”).
115
See supra text following note 105.
111
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resell, in contrast to the personalized price a firm charges to a buyer who
buys for personal consumption, should be greater by the amount of profit the
reselling buyer expects to earn from resale of the good. Courts have long
recognized that charging a price that a buyer cannot afford to pay is
tantamount to refusing to sell a product to the buyer.116 So personalized
pricing is its own restraint on competition from resellers, and satisfies both
the consumer harm and anticompetitive conduct requirements.117
Personalized pricing is its own restraint on competition, however, only
so long as the firm personalizes prices accurately. If the firm fails accurately
to identify the maximum that each consumer is willing to pay, then the prices
the firm personalizes to resellers will not deprive resellers of all of the profits
of resale, and may therefore fail to preclude resellers from buying, forcing
the firm to resort to additional means of denying resellers access to the firm’s
product. As discussed above, cases of imperfectly-implemented
personalized pricing can still satisfy the consumer harm requirement for
monopolization claims.118 In such cases, the additional means employed by
firms to refuse to sell to resellers constitute the anticompetitive conduct
required for a monopolization claim.
There are two main ways in which firms can take additional steps to
refuse to sell to resellers. The first is simply to refuse outright to sell units to
consumers whom the firm believes will use the units for arbitrage, instead
of for personal consumption. Supermarkets do this when they place quantity
caps on the purchase of discounted goods, forbidding a buyer of discount ice
cream, for example, from buying more than four pints at the discounted
price.119 When supermarkets combine these quantity limits with the
personalization of discount coupons that supermarkets print out for loyalty
club customers at checkout, the quantity limits prevent arbitrage of what
amounts to personalized prices for coupon items.120
The second means firms may employ to prevent purchase for resale is
116
See, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 541 (Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 1986)
(“Agreeing to deal on unreasonable terms is merely a type of refusal to deal.”). Of course, whether the
charging of a high price is justified, like the broader question whether a refusal to deal of any form is
justified, depends on whether the other elements of a monopolization claim are satisfied, including the
requirement of consumer harm—which takes the cost to the firm of providing access to the buyer into
account—and whether the general right to refuse to deal applies to save the conduct. See supra text
accompanying note 45. For the argument that personalized pricing is not justified by costs, see supra text
accompanying note 75; Section I.A.1; Section I.C.
117
For the consumer harm associated with personalized pricing, see supra Section I.A.1.
118
See supra text accompanying note 102.
119
See Brian Wansink et al., An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase Quantity Decisions,
35 J. MARKETING RES. 71, 74 (1998) (arguing that this practice also uses the psychology of anchoring to
induce consumers to buy up to the quantity limit).
120
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 11, at 12; Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y
41, 52 (2014).
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to impose resale restrictions either in the grant of title to the product to the
buyer or as part of a separate contract. Explicit restraints on the resale of
personal or intellectual property often run afoul of the general judicial
distaste for restraints on the alienation of property, a distaste that operates
independently of the antitrust laws.121 For example, in Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court applied the first-sale doctrine in
copyright law to refuse to enforce a publisher’s restriction on resale of
textbooks, a restriction that supported the publisher’s efforts to charge higher
prices to students in rich countries.122 The Court emphasized the
“importance of leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each other
when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods.”123 The policy against
restraints on alienation probably applies both to restrictions placed in grants
of title to personal or intellectual property, such as the prohibition at issue in
Kirtsaeng, and to restrictions imposed in contracts of sale of personal or
intellectual property.124 The courts similarly condemn restraints on the
alienation of real property, and in that context also do so regardless whether
the restraints are contained in the grant or extracted from the buyer in the
form of a separate contractual promise.125
But sometimes firms can skirt these rules and prevent resale anyway, as
the defendant in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., a case which
will appear again shortly as authority for the treatment of personalized

121
See Impression Products v. Lexmark Intern., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531–32 (2017) (referring to “the
common law principle against restraints on alienation”).
122
See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56, 1363 (2013). The restriction
placed by the publisher in each of its books read: “Exportation from or importation of this book to another
region without the Publisher’s authorization is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights.” Id. at
1356.
123
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363; see also Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1529.
124
For ambiguity on the question whether the policy against restraints on alienability applies to
void contract-based prohibitions on resale, see Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1533 (“Once sold, the
Return Program cartridges passed outside of the patent monopoly, and whatever rights Lexmark retained
are a matter of the contracts with its purchasers, not the patent law.”). For the view, contrary to that taken
here, that the policy against restraints on alienation does not prevent contract-based prohibitions on
resale, see Tim Scott, The Availability of Post-Sale Contractual Restrictions in the Wake of Impression
Products, Inc. v. Lexmark, 581 U.S. 1523 (2017), SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3218569 250 (Social Science
Research Network), Jul. 23, 2018 (“A sale or purchase of a good can be accompanied by a promise not
to use that good in a particular way, or only in a particular field or geography. Such a promise would be
enforceable against the promisor by way of injunction or damages.”). It should be noted that the law is
considerably more tolerant of restraints on alienation that fall short of prohibiting resale outright, at least
in the contract context. See Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions
on Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 623–25 (2012–2013); Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (ruling that restrictions on resale price
are not to be condemned per se).
125
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 159, 176, 206 (2d ed.
1983); Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug Co., 884 SW 2d 853, 856, 861–62 (Tex. Court of Appeals, 5th Dist.
1994) (ruling a contract that restrained alienability of real property void).
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pricing as monopolization, appears to have done. Instead of selling its
shoemaking machinery to customers outright, and prohibiting resale, United
Shoe chose instead to lease the machinery to its customers, and to place nosubletting clauses in the leases. This allowed United Shoe to avail itself of a
traditional exception to the policy against restraints on alienation, which
allows restraints on the resale of leasehold interests.127 The fact that the
government did not challenge the no-subletting clauses in United Shoe on
restraint-on-alienation grounds suggests that the tactic was successful.
Courts are far less averse to prohibitions on the resale of services than
they are to prohibitions on the alienability of property, with the result that
prohibitions on the resale of services, in the form of contractual prohibitions
on the assignment of service contracts, are quite common. Courts enforce
anti-assignment clauses, and although courts may limit the remedy to money
damages, those damages, in the form of the service provider’s lost profits
due to resale, are sufficient to render resale of service rights a loss-making
business.128 The airlines are therefore free, for example, to permit only the
named ticketholder to fly, thereby preventing ticket buyers from reselling
the right to fly to others.129 Similarly, hospitals are free to prevent patients
from assigning their rights to medical services to other patients, and thereby
to preclude insured patients from reselling, to uninsured patients, the
126
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954). For the significance of United Shoe as authority for the treatment of personalized
pricing as monopolization, see infra Section I.C.1.
127
Id. at 340–41, 344, 349; HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 386. For the exception for leasehold
interests, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 125, at 148 (“Forfeiture restraints which give to the
landlord an option to terminate the tenant’s interest if the tenant alienates without the landlord’s consent
are widely used in leases.”).
128
For the enforceability of anti-assignment clauses, and limitation of the remedy to money
damages, see EDWARD ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 717 (3d ed. 1999). The money damages
suffered by the firm when a low-price consumer resells the right to the firm’s services to a high-price
consumer would be the lost profits suffered by the firm as a result of not being able to sell the service
directly to the high-price consumer at the high price. A court would likely characterize these as
consequential damages, which are in general recoverable in breach of contract actions. See DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 54 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that “the
trend is certainly to award consequentials more freely”). Given the information requirements associated
with implementing personalized pricing, the firm would be able to prove the lost profits with the requisite
level of certainty. Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra, at 718 (stating that “it might not be easy to prove damages
for the breach [of an anti-assignment clause] with sufficient certainty”). It should be noted that even in
the absence of an express contractual limit on assignment, courts will refuse to permit assignments that
would impose a substantial burden on the service provider. See id. at 715. Liberal application of this rule
would make resale of services impossible regardless whether a firm takes steps to limit assignment, and
would therefore allow firms to personalize service prices without having to engage in anticompetitive
conduct and therefore without violating the antitrust laws. But courts have applied this limitation
sparingly. See id.
129
Christopher Elliott, Why Can’t Airline Tickets Be Transferable?, USA TODAY (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2013/12/23/airline-ticket-transfer-name-change/4174145/
(“If name changes were allowed, then passengers could resell their tickets anytime, subverting an
airline’s ability to raise ticket prices as the flight becomes full.”).
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insureds’ rights to medical services supplied at the low rates negotiated on
their behalf by insurers. 130
4. The Refusal to Permit Trade in Purchase Rights as Arbitrage
Prevention
Despite its crippling effect on competition between the firm and lowprice buyers who wish to act as resellers, the prevention of arbitrage may not
be enough to satisfy the anticompetitive conduct requirement of the antitrust
laws, for not all conduct that actually harms competition satisfies that
requirement.131 There is an exemption for conduct that improves products.132
All product improvements harm competition, because consumers prefer
improved products, and that puts competitors which have failed to innovate
at a disadvantage.133 Antitrust generally will not, however, treat productimproving conduct as anticompetitive, because product improvements are
the main source of welfare increases for consumers in the economy.134 The
courts fear that the process of balancing the benefits to consumers of product
improvements against consumer losses from the resulting decline in
competition and increase in prices is prone to error, and could result in
mistaken antitrust condemnation of consumer-beneficial conduct.135 So the
courts simply exempt product-improving conduct, no matter how harmful to
competition, from the antitrust laws.136
Many practices that prevent arbitrage simultaneously improve the
product offered by the firm, which suggests that many instances of arbitrage
prevention may fall within the exemption for product-improving conduct.
Clothes-washing machines, for example, are an improvement upon the
washing board, but washing machines are heavy, driving up transportation
costs and potentially preventing low-price consumers from reselling
130
See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 13, 24–
25 (2014) (describing price discrimination by hospitals between the insured and uninsured and observing
that at one hospital the cost of a joint replacement was $18,000 for an insured patient but $220,000 for
an uninsured patient).
131
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 364 (“The problem is that most efficient practices are
‘exclusionary’ in the sense that they injure rivals or make entry more difficult.”).
132
See id. at 365 (“[M]ost innovations and expansions by dominant firms that injure rivals are not
s. 2 violations, even though they do have the effect of expanding or maintaining monopoly power.”).
133
See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age, 127 YALE
L.J. 2270, 2309 (2018).
134
See id. at 2313.
135
See id. at 2313–14.
136
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (observing that
vanquishing competitors through “superior skill, foresight and industry” is no violation of the antitrust
laws); DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST AN
EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 28 (2015) (“[M]onopoly is generally tolerated when
legally acquired on the general rationale of promoting innovation even in specific instances where such
a prospect is far-fetched.”); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 613–14 (3d ed. 1990).
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washing machines to high-price consumers. The firm that first introduced
the washing machine to market might plausibly be said to have taken steps
to prevent arbitrage in the market for clothes-washing tools, but antitrust
would never treat such conduct as anticompetitive, because washing
machines are a genuine product improvement relative to washing boards and
therefore fall within the ambit of the product-improvement exemption.138
The spread of three-dimensional-printing-driven personalization of
product design threatens greatly to expand the set of arbitrage-preventing
practices that fall within the product-improvement exemption.139 Firms can
now tailor shoes, bite guards, and many other products precisely to fit the
bodies of their purchasers.140 This tailoring prevents arbitrage, because the
firm will tailor any additional units that low-price consumers buy for resale
to the low-price consumers, not to the high-price consumers to whom the
low-price consumers wish to transfer the units, and the high-price consumers
will not be willing to buy units that do not fit them. Because design
personalization makes products better, however, antitrust will not recognize
as anticompetitive the limits that design personalization places on
arbitrage.141
Even arbitrage-prevention techniques that seem at first glance to have
no bearing on product design can have product-improving effects that bring
them within the ambit of antitrust’s product-improvement exemption. The
airlines’ restriction of travel to named ticketholders not only prevents
arbitrage, for example, but also improves security, by allowing governments
to keep track of who is flying.142 The restriction of hospital care to named
purchasers ensures that each patient receives customized care. Indeed,
virtually all arbitrage-prevention mechanisms have the plausible productimprovement justification that the mechanisms improve the product by
allowing the firm to maintain quality control, saving consumers the expense
of having to inspect goods purchased from low-price consumers who may
have damaged the goods in the process of handling and storing them for
137

See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF
LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 9 (2017) (identifying washing machines as an improvement).
138
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 296, 300 (discussing the antitrust safe harbor for innovations).
139
See Nikolaus Franke et al., Testing the Value of Customization: When Do Customers Really
Prefer Products Tailored to Their Preferences?, 73 J. MARKETING 103, 103 (2009).
140
See Constance Gustke, Your Next Pair of Shoes Could Come From a 3-D Printer, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/business/smallbusiness/your-next-pair-of-shoescould-come-from-a-3-d-printer.html (describing a business that uses cellphone snapshots of feet and 3D
printers to make custom shoes and whose CEO states: “I saw 3-D printers in a magazine, and I thought
‘mass customization’”); Gina Kolata, A New Tooth, Made to Order in Under an Hour, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
8, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/a-new-tooth-made-to-order-in-under-anhour/ (describing how ten percent of dentists are currently able to use data from small cameras in the
mouth and a 3D printer to manufacture dental crowns in the office).
141
See supra note 136.
142
See Elliott, supra note 129.
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resale.
Despite appearances, the capacity of arbitrage prevention to improve
products does not ultimately block antitrust from treating arbitrage
prevention as anticompetitive conduct, because for virtually all forms of
arbitrage prevention there is a way to decouple any product-improving
effects from the restriction on arbitrage, allowing firms to permit resale
while still implementing associated product improvements. The ability to
decouple improvements from resale restrictions brings arbitrage prevention
out of the antitrust exemption for product-improving conduct, since the
exemption applies only if the restriction on competition is necessary to bring
about the improvement.144
Firms can decouple product improvements from resale restrictions by
creating online markets that allow low-price consumers to purchase, at low
personalized prices, the right to have a product delivered, and then to resell
that right, instead of purchasing the product itself at low prices and then
reselling the product itself. Because resale would take place before the firm’s
products are ever delivered or customized, any costs of redirecting the
products from one consumer to another subsequent to resale, and any
barriers to transfer posed by customization, would be avoided. For example,
the washing-machine maker could permit consumers to purchase and
transfer title to units that have not yet left the factory floor, allowing lowprice consumers to buy at low personalized prices and resell at high prices
to high-price consumers who could then take delivery of the units directly
from the manufacturer, eliminating the cost of trans-shipment between
reseller and ultimate buyer, as well as any quality-control concerns
surrounding the handling and storage of resold units.145
143
See Hillary A. Kremen, Note: Caveat Venditor: International Application of the First Sale
Doctrine Note, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 161, 167 (1997) (stating that “[q]uality control is a
concern” for resold goods because resellers “are only concerned with the quick sale and neither customer
satisfaction nor maintenance”); Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United States versus United Shoe
Machinery Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33, 42–43 (1993) (arguing that leasing practices
that prevented arbitrage of discriminatory practices were efficient because “[w]hen the prospective
reliability and other performance attributes of complex, durable goods are difficult to discern at the time
of purchase, outright sales pose well-known moral hazard problems”).
144
In other words, the ability to decouple product improvements from resale restrictions means that
there exists a less restrictive alternative to any method of arbitrage prevention that happens also to
improve the product. See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. 927, 929 (2016).
145
Of course, the ultimate buyer would be required to pay any incremental cost associated with
delivering the good to the ultimate buyer as opposed to the original buyer. But those costs will be smaller
than the costs of delivering the good to the reseller prior to resale to the ultimate buyer. If the costs do
not fall enough to make resale viable, then there is nothing that the firm can do to facilitate arbitrage of
its personalized prices, so the firm is not engaged in the prevention of arbitrage, and, in an important
sense, the resold good is not actually the same good as the one that the firm would sell directly to the
consumer who would otherwise be the ultimate buyer of the resold good. For more on what constitutes
two units of the same product, see infra Section I.B.3.
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Similarly, firms could treat the creation of customized products as a
service and permit consumers to buy rights to the service, instead of buying
the customized product itself.146 The low-price consumer could purchase
rights to the service and then resell those rights to high-price consumers,
each of whom could then arrange for the product to be tailored and delivered.
The 3D-printer-enabled shoe manufacturer could, for example, sell the right
to a pair of customized shoes, as opposed to the customized pair of shoes
itself, allowing low-price consumers to resell that right to high-price
consumers, who could then arrange for the shoes to be customized to their
own feet.147 Indeed, the sale of service rights unlocks the transferability of
all custom services, not just the service of tailoring physical goods to their
users. Low-price airline ticket buyers wishing to resell their tickets could,
for example, purchase rights to have tickets issued in ultimate-ticketholders’ names and then resell those rights to high-price buyers.148 Highprice buyers could then use those rights to arrange with the airlines to have
tickets issued in their names, ensuring that the airlines would continue to
have accurate information about the identity of each passenger.149
The low cost of communication and computing power in the information
age makes the creation of online platforms for the trading of purchase rights
inexpensive and supremely administrable.150 Of course, a firm that wishes
to engage in personalized pricing would never want actually to create such
a platform, because doing so would enable arbitrage. But that is the point.
The failure of firms to create low-cost systems that facilitate resale is
anticompetitive conduct: the prevention of arbitrage.151 Moreover, the pure
refusal of a firm to provide the minimal infrastructure required to allow lowprice consumers to buy and sell purchase rights in the firm’s product can
never qualify for the product-improvement exemption, because unlike other
methods of preventing arbitrage, such as the sale of customized products,
the refusal to make a market in purchase rights contributes nothing to the
quality of the underlying product.152 The fact that the refusal to make a
146

Of course, the ultimate buyer would be required to pay any incremental cost of customizing the
services to the ultimate buyer instead of to the original buyer. See supra note 145.
147
For customized shoes, see supra note 140.
148
See Elliott, supra note 129.
149
See id.
150
For cost declines in the information age, see Bart van Ark, The Productivity Paradox of the New
Digital Economy, INT’L PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR, Fall 2016, at 3, 8–9. Indeed, all a firm would need to
add to its operations in order to sell purchase rights instead of the underlying goods themselves would be
an interface—which could be implemented with information technology—to allow ultimate purchasers
to enter delivery or customization information after securing rights from resellers, and perhaps also to
allow the firm to take payment for any additional costs associated with delivery to a more distant location
or customization to a more difficult subject. Everything else, from sales to fulfillment, could remain the
same.
151
See text accompanying note 114.
152
For the product improvement exemption, see supra text accompanying note 136.
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market in purchase rights amounts to an omission, rather than an affirmative
act, does not make it any less anticompetitive.153 All refusals to deal are
omissions, because all refusals are omissions to do the thing refused, but
antitrust has long condemned certain refusals to deal as anticompetitive
conduct.154
B. Monopoly Power
1. Personalized Pricing Is Evidence of Monopoly Power
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive conduct that
harms consumers, such as a firm’s refusal to deal with resellers in aid of a
scheme to personalize prices, only when the firm engaging in that conduct
has monopoly power.155 Proving monopoly power can be the hardest part of
a monopolization action, but in the case of personalized pricing it is easy,
because any firm that is able to personalize prices, even imperfectly, has
monopoly power as defined by the antitrust laws.156 Antitrust defines
monopoly power to be the power profitably to raise price above the
competitive level, with that level usually chosen to be marginal cost.157
Firms that charge uniform prices often do not meet this definition because
an increase in a uniform price can render low-willingness-to-pay consumers
unable to buy.158 The profits lost from no longer being able to sell to those
consumers can exceed the increased profits generated from the higher prices
paid by those who do continue to buy, making the price increase unprofitable
overall.159 But this tradeoff between increased profits from inframarginal
consumers and lost profits from marginal consumers does not exist when a
firm uses personalized pricing to raise prices, because personalized pricing
allows firms to raise prices to high-willingness-to-pay consumers without
raising prices to low-willingness-to-pay consumers.160 That in turn allows
firms to extract more profits from those who can pay more, without at the
153
See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences, and Normality, 94
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 74, 74 (2004).
154
See generally Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law,
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443 (2002) (discussing cases in which denial of access to an “essential facility” was
treated as illegal exclusionary conduct).
155
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
156
For the difficulty of establishing monopoly power, see Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of
Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1462 (2009) (stating that “antitrust
discovery is inevitably costly and protracted. One reason is that . . . . [d]efining the relevant market, by
itself, is fact-intensive, timeconsuming, costly . . . .”).
157
See John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169, 1173–
74, 1181 (2018).
158
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 429–32; John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust
Enforcement 1181 (Seattle Univ. Sch. L., Working Paper, 2017) (“If a firm can price above marginal
cost, it must have some ability to raise price without losing all its sales . . . .”).
159
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 429–32.
160
See id. at 445–46. For another statement of this point, see supra text accompanying note 67.
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same time suffering losses from pricing those who are not willing to pay
more out of the market.161
Personalized pricing is evidence of monopoly power even for the firm
that is able only imperfectly to personalize prices.162 Imperfections in
personalization can manifest in two ways: the personalizing of prices that
are below a customer’s maximum willingness to pay or the personalization
of prices that are above a firm’s maximum willingness to pay. If the price is
too low, the firm fails to extract the maximum possible profit from the
customer, but it is reasonable to assume that the firm will nevertheless
extract more profit than if the firm had charged a uniform price equal to
marginal cost, otherwise the firm would not bother to personalize the price.
If the price is too high, then the firm will lose the customer’s business,
leading to a loss that may offset gains from the charging of personalized
prices to other customers. But it is reasonable to assume that a firm will not
implement personalized pricing if these losses exceed the gains, because
then the firm would generate more profit by continuing to charge a uniform
price equal to marginal cost. It follows that evidence that a firm engages in
personalized pricing is evidence that the firm is able profitably to raise price
above marginal cost, regardless whether the firm is able to personalize prices
to perfection.
Recognizing that personalized pricing implies monopoly power would
seem to imply that virtually all firms will have monopoly power, because all
firms will eventually be able to generate profits through the personalization
of prices. Virtually all firms sell differentiated products, and any firm that
sells a differentiated product can increase profits by personalizing higher
prices to those who prefer the product over the products of competitors.163 It
would seem to follow that the law will one day need to hold every firm to
the prohibition on consumer-harmful anticompetitive conduct imposed by
Section 2 on monopolists.164 Recognizing personalized pricing as proof of
monopoly power will not open up the litigation floodgates, however,
because firms will always be able to avoid the monopoly characterization as
a practical matter simply by refraining from actually engaging in
personalized pricing. A firm that does not personalize prices generates none
of the evidence of power profitably to raise prices that a court needs to
161
See id. Group-based pricing can also enable a firm profitably to raise prices, and for the same
reasons. But unlike group-based pricing, which is profitable only if the losses associated with pricing
marginal consumers out of each group do not exceed the gains from charging higher prices to
inframarginal consumers, personalized pricing is always profitable, relative to uniform pricing, and
personalized pricing alone is therefore always in itself evidence of a firm’s monopoly power.
162
For other implications of imperfection in the personalization of prices, see supra text
accompanying note 102.
163
See supra text accompanying note 63. For the ubiquity of product differentiation, see Klein &
Wiley, supra note 84, at 609. Product differentiation is discussed in greater detail in Section I.B.2, infra.
164
See supra text accompanying note 45.
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conclude that the firm has monopoly power based on personalized pricing.
A court might still of course rely on other evidence to conclude that the firm
has monopoly power, but establishing monopoly power by other means is
normally difficult to do.165
In any case, treating personalized pricing as evidence of monopoly
power is no departure from current antitrust doctrine, because the courts
have already long treated price discrimination of all kinds as evidence of
monopoly power.166 The courts must, a fortiori, treat the peculiarly
profitable form of price discrimination that is personalized pricing as
evidence of monopoly power.167 Even if the courts choose not to treat
personalized pricing as direct evidence of monopoly power, enforcers can
still always prove that a price-personalizing firm has monopoly power by
using the alternative, indirect, method of proof of monopoly power also
recognized by the courts.168 Establishing monopoly power by indirect proof
requires showing that the price-personalizing firm has a market share in
excess of about seventy-five percent in a properly-defined relevant market.
A properly-defined relevant market is one in which, if market participants
were to cartelize and raise price together by more than a certain amount
above competitive levels, usually five percent, they would increase their
aggregate profits.169 Market definition generally starts by asking whether the
firm could profitably raise the price of its own product.170 If not, then the
firm’s product is considered alongside the closest substitute product sold by
a competitor, and the question is posed again: could the prices of both
165

See Stucke, supra note 156, at 1462.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 158 (stating that “price discrimination is evidence of market
power”); Jonathan B. Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise of Market Power without
Anticompetitive Effects (Comment on Klein and Wiley), 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 650 (2003) (“The link
between price discrimination and market power is well established in antitrust, both in the case law and
in the writings of . . . a truly impressive list of scholars.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); ANDREW
I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 550–51 (3d ed. 2017).
167
For the profitability of personalized pricing, see supra text accompanying note 50.
168
For the distinction between direct and indirect proof of monopoly power, see GAVIL ET AL.,
supra note 166, at 544–45. For more on the indirect method of proof, see H OVENKAMP, supra note 1, at
92, 293 (stating that a court “usually . . . determines a relevant . . . market . . . and . . . computes the
defendant’s percentage of the output in the relevant market thus defined,” and that “[s]everal courts have
found a market share on the order of 75% to be sufficient . . .” to establish the existence of market power
(footnotes omitted)) (sources cited therein).
169
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, §§
4.1.1, 4.1.2 (2010) (defining this test and stating that “[t]he Agencies most often use a [price increase] of
five percent of the price paid by customers for the products or services . . . .”); Malcolm B. Coate &
Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1031, 1031 (2008) (describing this test as “well established as the test for
market definition at the United States enforcement agencies, the federal courts, and many international
antitrust regimes”); HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 112, 357 (stating the test in terms of cartelization and
indicating that a seventy-five percent market share likely passes the test).
170
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 111–12.
166
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products be increased without reducing the aggregate profits on the two
products earned by the two firms?171 If yes, then the relevant market includes
only the two products.172 If no, then a third product is considered alongside
the first two and the process repeats until a group of products is found for
which price could profitably be raised.173 Once the market has been defined
in this way, evidence that the firm’s own product has a high share of the
market so defined establishes that the firm has monopoly power.174
Generally, enforcers seek to show monopoly power by this indirect route
only when the properly-defined relevant market includes more products than
just the firm’s own product.175 The requirement for defining the relevant
market to contain just the firm’s own product, that the firm be able profitably
to raise the price of the firm’s own product, is precisely the requirement for
establishing monopoly power by direct proof—that the firm be able
profitably to raise price—and establishing monopoly power by direct proof
has the advantage over indirect proof that no additional proof of market
share is required.176 Because personalized pricing always implies the power
profitably to raise price for the firm’s own product, it follows that the method
of indirect proof is unnecessary and should be discouraged in personalized
pricing cases.177 But that does not mean that enforcers cannot define an ownproduct relevant market if they choose to do so, and proceed to establish
monopoly power by indirect proof.178 The additional burden should not be
too great, because once the own-product market is established as the relevant
market, high market share follows almost immediately, because the firm that
personalizes prices must prevent arbitrage, and that in turn ensures that no
one, not even a reseller, sells the same product as does the firm, implying a
market share of 100% in the market for the firm’s own product.179
2. Challenging Antitrust’s Bias in Favor of Interbrand Competition
Treating personalized pricing as evidence of monopoly power, whether
as direct evidence or as a basis for defining an own-product relevant market
under the indirect method of proof, conflicts with a strong tendency in
antitrust to respect the power of a firm to prevent competitors from selling
products identical to the firm’s own products, and to attack monopoly power
171

See id.
See id.
173
See id.
174
See id. at 109–10.
175
See id. at 124–30.
176
For the definition of monopoly power as the power profitably to raise price, see Kirkwood, supra
note 158, at 1173–74, 1181.
177
For the argument that personalized pricing always implies the power profitably to raise price for
the firm’s own product, see supra text accompanying note 156.
178
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 175 (suggesting that courts rarely, if ever, rely exclusively on
direct proof of monopoly power).
179
For the role of arbitrage prevention in personalized pricing, see supra Section I.A.3.
172
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only by promoting competition between differentiated products. The way
antitrust normally seeks to prevent harm to consumers arising from the
charging of higher prices, whether as part of a price discrimination scheme
or simply the increase of uniform prices, is by stopping firms from erecting
barriers to competition from other, substitute products.181 Stop firms from
harming competition between different brands, the thinking goes, and
consumers will end up with such enviable alternatives to the product offered
by the price-raising firm that any attempt to raise prices will just cause
consumers to take their business elsewhere, and so firms will desist from
personalizing prices or indeed from price increases of any kind.182
This preference for promoting competition between different products
offered by different firms—known as interbrand competition—instead of
promoting competition between identical products offered by a firm and
resellers of the firm’s own products—known as intrabrand competition—
has nothing to do with economics.183 Both forms of competition are effective
ways of eliminating the power of a firm profitably to raise prices. Indeed,
intrabrand competition is probably more effective because interbrand
competition drives down prices only to the extent that the different brands
resemble each other, and competition then starts to take on the character of
intrabrand competition.184 Price competition between Coke and Pepsi will
be fiercer than price competition between Coke and bottled water, for
180
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 124 & n. 58 (stating that “most courts refuse to find single
brand relevant markets”) (sources cited therein).
181
See United States v. EI du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 392–93 (1956) (“A retail seller may
have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade because of location, as an isolated country store or filling
station, or because no one else makes a product of just the quality or attractiveness of his product, as for
example in cigarettes. Thus one can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every
nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price and production of his
own product. However, this power that, let us say, automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have over
their trademarked products is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be
appraised in terms of the competitive market for the product.”).
182
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 177.
183
See id. at 602 (distinguishing interbrand restraints from intrabrand restraints).
184
See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 7 (“[C]ontrol over price is completely eliminated only when
all producers are producing the identical good and selling it in the identical market.”). The tendency of
antitrust to ignore the relative superiority of intrabrand competition is illustrated by Herbert
Hovenkamp’s insistence that price discrimination in competitive markets is good for competition because
it encourages new firms to enter markets. He writes that “sales . . .to . . . high preference purchasers
would attract new competitors into at least that part of the market.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 386.
While the increased profits made possible by personalized pricing certainly can attract entry from firms
offering differentiated, but substitute, products, this entry can never reduce to zero the extra profits
allowed firms by personalized pricing, because competition cannot eliminate all differences between
products, as Hovenkamp himself admits. See id. at 623 (“[E]ven tiny airlines in intense competition with
larger rivals price discriminate in filling their seats.”). So while personalized pricing may be
procompetitive in interbrand markets in the sense employed by Hovenkamp, it remains anticompetitive—
if supported by measures designed to prevent arbitrage—and harmful to consumers, in intrabrand
markets. See supra Section I.A.3.
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example, because Coke and Pepsi are both colas, and this similarity makes
a consumer of Coke more likely to switch to Pepsi than to water when faced
with a Coke price increase. Interbrand competition can never drive price all
the way down to marginal cost because consumers prefer some brand names
over others, even when consumers are otherwise completely unable to
distinguish between products, and trademark law prevents firms from selling
under each others’ brand names.185
This contrasts rather starkly with intrabrand competition, in which
multiple sellers have the right to, and do in fact, sell products that are
identical in all dimensions, including name. Consumers cannot distinguish
between the goods sold by different sellers in intrabrand competition, and so
consumers buy based purely on price, leading to competition that in theory
should drive prices all the way down to marginal cost, a result achievable by
interbrand competition only in the limit, as competing brands come to lock
so tightly in competitive embrace that they eventually become identical to
each other, trademark rules permitting.186 Consumers will always distinguish
between Coke and Pepsi, because the two products are sold under different
names, and those who prefer the Coke logo will be willing to pay a premium
for that symbol. But consumers cannot distinguish between sold-by-CocaCola Coke and resold-by-low-price-buyers Coke on any basis, save perhaps
the identity of the seller. To the extent that whether a product is offered by
a reseller is less important to buyers than brand name, the intrabrand price
competition between Coca-Cola and resellers will be stronger than the
interbrand competition between Coke and Pepsi. Thus the promotion of
intrabrand competition is likely a more effective competition policy than the
promotion of interbrand competition.187
If the reason antitrust chooses to promote competition in the interbrand
market instead of in the intrabrand market has nothing to do with economic
necessity, then what exactly is the cause of antitrust’s preference for
interbrand competition? The answer is antitrust’s aversion to treating the
traditional methods firms use to prevent competitors from entering the

185
See Klein & Wiley, supra note 84, at 609 (“In nearly every real-world competitive market,
products are differentiated to some degree. Each firm’s product has some unique characteristics that
distinguish it from the products of competitors. One unique characteristic is the product’s trademark.”).
The fact that consumers prefer some brand names over others, even when consumers are completely
unable to distinguish between products, has been proven in the case of Coke and Pepsi. See Samuel M.
McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON
379, 384–85 (2004).
186
See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 271 (“When one producer copies the name, symbol,
package, or product of another, the result is goods more nearly standardized, and, if the imitator is
successful, a reduction in the profits of his rival.”).
187
See id. at 273–74 (observing that intrabrand competition results in lower prices than does
interbrand competition).
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intrabrand market as violations of the antitrust laws. Firms use property
and intellectual property law to prevent competitors from selling products
identical to their own.189 Property law prevents Pepsi executives from
walking into a Coke bottler, running the machines, and carting off pallets of
Coke for Pepsi to sell on its own account.190 Patent, copyright, and trade
secret further prevent Pepsi from reproducing the production methods,
flavor, and promotional materials used by Coca-Cola in Coke production.191
Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, trademark forever prevents
Pepsi from using and promoting the Coke mark.192 Antitrust is strongly
opposed to treating the bare exercise of a property or intellectual property
right as an antitrust violation.193 But in many cases antitrust would be forced
to do that were antitrust to treat the intrabrand market as the relevant market,
188
See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 116–23 (2013)
(discussing the antitrust exemption for “property-based exclusion,” which forestalls intrabrand
competition by preventing competitors from selling identical products through copying); CHAMBERLIN,
supra note 63, at 270–73.
189
Property law prevents competitors from stealing the firm’s production facilities. See infra note
190. Intellectual property law prevents copying of those facilities, as well as product attributes. See infra
notes 191, 192; CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 57–64.
190
Doing so would be trespass. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of
Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 13 (1985) (“Generally speaking, when the intrusion
is governed by trespass, then there is no exception for de minimis harms, a rule of strict liability applies,
and the landholder can obtain an injunction to prevent future invasions.”). For a hypothetical example in
this spirit, in which competitors are permitted to enter a factory and run the machines whenever the
factory’s owner seeks to restrict output, see Woodcock, supra note 188, at 165–66.
191
See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 241, 248 (1998) (stating that anything that confers a “competitive advantage when kept
secret” and is “secret in fact” can be protected under trade secret law); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 323, 434 542 (6th ed. 2012) (observing
that copyright law prohibits copying of works of literary or artistic expression and patent law prohibits
use of patented inventions).
192
See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 63, at 272–73 (discussing the role of trademark in preventing
complete copying of a product). Indeed, producing goods identical to those of a competitor is a violation
of the common law doctrine of unfair competition, independent of the existence of any trademark
protecting the brand. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412–13 (1916) (“Courts
afford redress or relief upon the ground that a party has a valuable interest in the good-will of his trade
or business, and in the trade-marks adopted to maintain and extend it. The essence of the wrong consists
in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those of another. This essential element is the
same in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition unaccompanied with trade-mark infringement.
In fact, the common law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.” (citation
omitted)). Unlike a patent or a copyright, a trademark has no formal limit to its duration. See Giovanni
B. Ramello, What’s in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory, 20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 547, 555
(2006) (“[A]lthough the duration of the [trademark] right is theoretically infinite, in practice there exist
a number of derogations to the property right designed to limit appropriability when the expected social
costs exceed the benefits[.]”); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (stating that the term of a patent ends 20 years after
the date of filing); Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States,
http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm (last updated Feb. 7, 2019) (surveying
byzantine rules regarding copyright term in the United States).
193
See Woodcock, supra note 188, at 118–23 (discussing antitrust’s aversion to condemning
“property-based exclusion”).
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because promoting competition in an intrabrand market requires that
competitors be allowed to appropriate or copy the incumbent’s output.194 So
antitrust does not promote intrabrand competition.
Three factors make the promotion of competition in intrabrand markets
appropriate as a response to personalized pricing, notwithstanding antitrust’s
traditional aversion to interfering with the ability of firms to exercise their
property rights. First, forcing firms to deal with resellers is not a particularly
radical intrusion into the property rights of firms because the forced dealing
would not require firms to sell to consumers with whom they have never
dealt before. All low-price consumers who engage in resale also buy the
product for personal consumption, which is what gives these consumers
access to the product at a low personalized price to begin with.195 The
remedy for the firm’s refusal to deal with these consumers is, at most, merely
to require firms to sell additional units to these consumers for resale, which
amounts to no more than insisting that firms continue a course of dealing
they have already embraced.196
The second factor that makes promoting competition in intrabrand
markets the appropriate choice in personalized pricing cases is that most
interbrand markets in the U.S. are concentrated, or otherwise uncompetitive,
but there is little that antitrust can do to promote competition in these
markets under current law.197 For example, much anticompetitive conduct
by single firms falls within either the exemption for product-improving
conduct or an exemption known as the right to refuse to deal, and much
anticompetitive conduct by groups of firms falls within an exemption for
tacit collusion.198 Because antitrust cannot do more to promote interbrand
competition, attacking anticompetitive behavior in intrabrand markets gives

194
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 444 (observing that perfect competition requires that competitors
sell “identical” products).
195
See supra text accompanying note 113.
196
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 415–16 (discussing forced sharing as the remedy for a refusal
to deal). As discussed in Section I.C.4.ii, the far less burdensome remedy of allowing firms to continue
to decide whether and to whom to sell, and only requiring firms to offer any products they choose to sell
at non-personalized prices, could be used instead.
197
See Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/03/26/too-much-of-a-good-thing (using U.S. Economic
Census data to show that average concentration in U.S. industry rose eight percent between 1997 and
2012).
198
Section I.C discusses the right to refuse to deal. Section I.A.4 discusses the exemption for
product-improving conduct. If the power obtained through product-improving conduct is used to drive
prices above costs, then the conduct harms consumers. Woodcock, supra note 188, at 126–36 (using an
economic model to show how the benefits of rewarding the creation of superior products or the
application of business acumen can fail to outweigh the costs of monopoly power). Tacit collusion
between firms that is enabled by high market concentration levels does not violate the antitrust laws,
even though it results in higher prices. See POSNER, supra note 21, at 55 (criticizing the exemption of
tacit collusion from condemnation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
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antitrust a new way to intervene to help consumers.
The third factor that makes promoting competition in intrabrand markets
the appropriate choice for antitrust in personalized pricing cases is that
personalized pricing magnifies the harm to consumers inflicted by any given
level of a firm’s power over interbrand markets, by allowing the firm to
extract surpluses from consumers that the firm would not be able to reach
through uniform pricing.200 That is what it means for personalized pricing to
be able to increase a firm’s profits and harm consumers relative even to
uniform pricing at monopoly levels.201 If demand is linear and marginal cost
constant, for example, personalized pricing doubles the amount of surplus
that a monopoly can extract from consumers.202 As a result, promoting
intrabrand competition as a remedy for personalized pricing would not
undermine the balance between firm and consumer interests struck by
current levels of interbrand competition, but rather would serve only to
prevent personalized pricing from upsetting that balance in favor of firms.203
3. Defining the Relevant Product
Recognizing personalized pricing—or the arbitrage prevention required
to support personalized pricing—as anticompetitive creates a novel problem
for antitrust: determining whether any two products are so similar that
charging different prices for them to different consumers should count as the
personalized pricing of different units of the same product.204 Treating the
personalization of prices for different products—charging a higher price to
a buyer of Sprite and a lower price to a buyer of Coke—as anticompetitive
199
See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1401–6 (arguing that stricter antitrust rules and enforcement are
required to counteract the additional harm inflicted by personalized pricing for any given level of market
power); Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Bargaining Robot, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2017, at 40, 41–42,
44.
200
See Woodcock, supra note 199, at 41 (describing this power of personalized pricing to inflict
greater harm on consumers for any given level of market power as a “second dimension” of power).
201
See supra Section I.A.1.
202
Suppose that demand is
, where
, is the price that just renders quantity demanded
zero, is the rate at which price must fall for demand to increase by a single unit, is the number of
units demanded, and marginal cost is zero. Then total surplus at the uniform competitive price of zero is
. At the uniform profit-maximizing (monopoly) price and quantity of and
, respectively,

the monopolist takes

, which is half of total surplus at the competitive price, in the form of profit.

If the monopolist personalizes prices, the monopolist then takes the remaining surplus, doubling the
amount of surplus taken by the monopolist relative to the amount the monopolist takes under uniform
pricing. For the characteristic of personalized pricing that it allocates all surplus to the firm, see supra
text accompanying note 54.
203
For a related argument, see supra text accompanying note 75.
204
There appears to be no prior literature defining what constitutes units of the same product for
purposes of identifying price discrimination. See Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination without
Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 15–16 (2002) (observing that the definition of the product as the
set of perfect substitutes is unrealistic, because consumer tastes differ between “production substitutes”
and concluding that “[e]conomics does not have an unambiguous definition of ‘product’”).
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would effectively create a duty for any individual firm to charge the same
price for all of its products. That would wreak havoc across the economy,
forcing an electronics manufacturer, for example, either to embrace a single
product line, thereby wasting the economies of scope associated with multiproduct operations, or to sell light switches at the million-dollar-per-unit
price the firm needs to cover the cost of producing and selling wind
turbines.205
What, then, does it mean to charge different prices for different units of
the same product? What makes one unit the same as another? The answer
cannot be that two units are identical only when they are identical in physical
form. Not only are no two goods absolutely alike—each will have small
differences, perhaps at the microscopic level—but no two goods, even if
physically identical, can exist in the same place at the same time. And yet a
good here now is meaningfully different, for most consumers, than a good
there later, suggesting that time and location are product attributes, and
therefore that no two units of a good can really be the same.206 To avoid the
implication of this line of reasoning, which is that personalized pricing is
impossible because no two goods are really the same, some rule is required
to allow antitrust to treat groups of admittedly individually unique products
offered by the same firm as the same product.207 What is required, to draw
an analogy to the market definition process associated with indirect proof of
monopoly power, is the definition of the relevant product.208
Antitrust should define the relevant product to include all units of
production for which, if the firm were to personalize prices, arbitrage would
be possible. That is, any unit that a high-price buyer would be willing to buy
from a reseller in lieu of the unit the firm wishes to sell to the buyer at a
personalized high price should count as the same product as the product the
firm wishes to sell to the high-price buyer. Letting the possibility of arbitrage
define what counts as the same product amounts to letting consumers—or
guesses about what consumers would do—decide which goods count as the
205

See ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM
24 (1994) (discussing economies of scope); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 7 (observing that differences in prices result from
differences in costs).
206
I am grateful to Russell D. Covey for suggesting this argument to me. See CHAMBERLIN, supra
note 63, at 56 (observing that product differentiation exists if “any significant basis exists for
distinguishing the goods” and “[i]t may also exist with respect to the conditions surrounding [the good’s]
sale[,]” including “the convenience of the seller’s location”). The value of location to consumers is
reflected in the importance of location to the definition of interbrand markets. See HOVENKAMP, supra
note 1, at 124 (“The relevant geographic market for antitrust purposes is some geographic area in which
a firm can increase its price without 1) large numbers of its customers quickly turning to alternative
supply sources outside the area or 2) producers outside the area quickly flooding the area with substitute
products.”).
207
See Levine, supra note 204, at 15–16.
208
See id.
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same and which do not. Under this test, if consumers would not treat a pair
of goods as so alike that they would be willing to substitute a resold unit for
the original, then the pair of goods are different and personalized pricing
between them would be irrelevant for antitrust purposes. Here products that
may look different or exist in different places and at different times count as
the same if resellers are capable of overcoming these differences to make a
market in them.
Determining whether resale is possible between a set of products is of
course a counterfactual undertaking, particularly in the context of an
antitrust challenge to personalized pricing predicated upon the claim that the
firm has taken steps to prevent resale, which would imply that consumers
have not in fact had a full opportunity to buy resold units.209 But proving
counterfactuals is nothing new in antitrust.210 To challenge any practice as
anticompetitive under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is necessary to show
that the practice harms competition, and that in turn must rest on the claim
that in the absence of the practice competition would be stronger.211 Showing
that resale would have been possible between units of a product but for
restrictions placed by a firm on arbitrage amounts to doing no more than
that.
Whether resale would be possible, and therefore whether a group of
products count as the same product for antitrust purposes, depends on how
costly resale would be for resellers were the firm to do nothing to restrict
resale.212 That is, the counterfactual question whether resale is possible
between a set of products must be answered under the assumption that the
firm is taking no steps to prevent resale. Making that assumption in turn
requires a determination regarding what practices should count as restrictive
and what practices should count as benign, even if they may incidentally
raise the cost of resale. That determination has already been made in the
determination of what practices count as anticompetitive arbitrage
prevention under the Sherman Act.213 The answer is that a firm’s adjustment
of prices to extract resale profits from consumers who engage in resale, and
additional refusal to allow consumers to buy and trade the right to purchase
the product at the price personalized by the firm to the consumer, counts as

209

See supra Section I.A.3.
See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic
Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 4 (2010) (describing market
definition as difficult and error prone because it requires “the analyst to predict price changes by a
counterfactual firm”).
211
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the
requirement of harm to competition).
212
See supra text accompanying note 137.
213
See supra Section I.A.4.
210
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the restriction of arbitrage. For the charging of prices that do not account
for resale profits is required to ensure that resellers are able to buy low and
sell high, and rights trading is required to decouple resale from transshipment, product customization, and other problems that might in many
cases make resale impossible even if the firm were not to charge prices to
resellers that would eliminate resellers’ profits from resale.215 It follows that
if a low-price consumer would be willing to resell a right to purchase a
product from a firm at a price personalized by the firm to the low-price
consumer without regard to the profits the low-price consumer might earn
from reselling the product, and a high-price consumer would be willing to
purchase that resold right in lieu of buying another product directly from the
firm at a high personalized price, then the two products should count as the
same product and the personalization of their prices should count as the
personalized pricing of units of the same product.
Defining the relevant product in terms of the possibility of resale ensures
that products will be treated as the same for personalized pricing purposes
only if any production cost differences are not so large as to explain entirely
the difference in prices between the two products.216 Thus the question
whether a Coke offered for $2 in Missouri and another offered for $3 in
California is the same product for purposes of personalized pricing would
depend upon whether the California buyer would be willing to buy the right
to the Missouri Coke—and pay any shipping surcharge associated with
delivery of that Coke to California instead of Missouri—were the Missouri
buyer to offer that right for a price below $3.217 By the same token, defining
the relevant product in terms of the possibility of resale also ensures that
products are not treated as identical simply in virtue of having identical
production costs. It may cost Coca-Cola the same amount to produce and
deliver a Sprite or a Coke to a particular consumer, but the two products
should be treated as the same only if consumers themselves would treat them
as substitutes in the resale market.218
214

For the adjustment of prices to extract resale profits as a form of arbitrage prevention, see supra
text accompanying note 115. For the refusal to allow resellers to trade purchase rights as a form of
arbitrage prevention, see supra text accompanying note 151.
215
See supra text accompanying notes 115, 151.
216
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 11, at 7.
217
See supra note 145.
218
Of course, when different products have the same production costs, the charging of personalized
prices for the two products inflicts the same kind of consumer harm that the personalized pricing of one
particular product inflicts. Charging a high-willingness-to-pay buyer of Sprite a high price and a low
willingness to pay buyer of Coke a low price extracts the exact same amount of consumer surplus as
would charging a high price to one buyer of Coke and a low price to another, assuming that Sprite and
Coke have the same production costs with respect to all of these buyers. But there can be no claim of
anticompetitive prevention of arbitrage in the case of personalized pricing across products so long as
consumers do not view the products as substitutes. If the high-willingness-to-pay buyer of Sprite will not
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C. The Right to Refuse to Deal Does Not Apply
Establishing that the prevention of arbitrage is anticompetitive and
harmful to consumers, that the product-improvement exemption does not
apply, and that price-personalizing firms have monopoly power, is not
enough to make a monopolization claim, because when a firm prevents a
low-price consumer from buying for resale, the firm engages in a refusal to
deal, and most refusals to deal fall within a broad antitrust exemption that
the Supreme Court calls the “long recognized right of trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.”219 This “right
to refuse to deal” does not, however, apply to the prevention of arbitrage in
aid of personalized pricing.220
1. United Shoe
The courts have never squarely addressed the question whether a refusal
to deal with an arbitrager is protected by the right to refuse to deal, but
United Shoe comes close.221 In United Shoe, clauses in the shoe machinery
maker’s leases prevented low-rental-price lessees from subletting shoemaking machinery to high-rental-price lessees, and thereby allowed United
buy Coke at any price, then Coca-Cola does not need to engage in prevention of arbitrage to support its
personalizing of prices to the Sprite and Coke buyers, and therefore no monopolization claim can be
brought against Coca-Cola. The inability of the proposed definition of the relevant product to reach this
case represents no great loss to consumers, however, because a firm that personalizes prices across
products likely also personalizes prices within products, exposing the firm to monopolization liability for
the within-product personalization of prices. If Coca-Cola personalizes higher prices to high-willingnessto-pay buyers of Sprite than to low-willingness-to-pay buyers of Coke, Coca-Cola likely also
personalizes lower prices to low-willingness-to-pay buyers of Sprite than to high-willingness-to-pay
buyers of Sprite, and higher prices to high-willingness-to-pay buyers of Coke than to low-willingnessto-pay buyers of Coke, exposing the company to separate liability for personalized pricing of both
products.
219
See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Pitofsky et al., supra note 154,
at 446 (discussing the “the general rule that a firm has no obligation to deal with its competitors”); GAVIL
ET AL., supra note 22, at 706 (“For the most part, courts have declined to require monopolists to cooperate
with another business entity.”). The legal concept of “refusal to deal” extends beyond outright refusals
to sell and includes the placing of any sort of restriction on access by a potential competitor to an input
owned by the firm. See IIIB HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 299–300 n.55 (4th ed. 2015)
(listing cases in which restrictions that fell short of outright refusal to deal were treated as covered by the
right to refuse to deal). For example, charging a very high price counts as a refusal to deal. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 328 (treating the charging of a high price as a refusal to deal). For the
anticompetitive character of arbitrage prevention, see supra Section I.A.3. For the consumer-harmful
character of arbitrage prevention, see supra Section I.A.1. For the monopoly power of firms that prevent
arbitrage, see Section I.B. For arbitrage prevention as refusal to deal, see supra text accompanying note
114.
220
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 321–22 (discussing the existence of an exception to the right
to refuse to deal).
221
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 340 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). For more on the case, see supra Section I.A.3.
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Shoe to earn “a higher rate of return where competition is of minor
significance, and a lower rate of return where competition is of major
significance.”222 The court responded by ordering non-discriminatory
pricing of the leases, a remedy that denies a firm’s right to refuse to deal, at
least to a small extent, by regulating the terms of any dealing undertaken by
the firm.223 More significantly, the court also ordered United Shoe to offer
shoemaking machinery not just for lease but also for sale, because, “[i]nsofar
as United’s machines are sold rather than leased, they will ultimately, in
many cases, reach a second-hand market. From that market, United will face
a type of substitute competition which will gradually weaken the prohibited
market power which it now exercises.”224 Thus the court forced United Shoe
to deal in the sale of shoe-making machines for the express purpose of
promoting resale competition.225 While the court’s remedy was clearly
aimed at resale, the court professed to hold United Shoe liable not for
preventing arbitrage in aid of its price discrimination scheme, but for using
price discrimination—specifically the cutting of prices in competitive
markets—to discourage competitors from selling competing brands of
shoemaking machinery.226 Thus liability was based on harm to competition
in interbrand markets, rather than harm to competition from resellers seeking
to arbitrage United Shoe’s discriminatory prices in intrabrand markets.227
Courts have broad authority to create remedies for violations of the antitrust
laws that do more than just reverse the conduct that gives rise to liability.228
The fact that the court in United Shoe ordered dealing to promote resale does
not therefore guarantee that courts would set aside the right of a seller to
refuse to deal in considering whether the prevention of arbitrage should give
rise to liability for monopolization. United Shoe is therefore not entirely
222
See id. at 315, 340–41; HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 316 (stating that United Shoe’s “leasing
may have facilitated price discrimination by preventing arbitrage”); POSNER, supra note 21, at 234
(observing that “[b]y leasing instead of selling, the monopolist can prevent a secondhand market from
developing”); Michael Waldman, Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative
Explanation for Leasing, 40 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66 (1997) (recounting the argument of Victor Goldberg in
an unpublished manuscript as follows: “In a sales market, price discrimination is difficult because of the
possibility of arbitrage, that is, customers offered a low price can purchase and resell to those customers
the monopolist is trying to charge a high price. By using the lease-only option United eliminated arbitrage
opportunities and then achieved price discrimination through the classic scheme sometimes referred to
as metered sales”); John Shepard Wiley Jr et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 717–
18 (1990) (making the argument that the leases were in aid of price discrimination).
223
United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 340–41, 349. It should be noted that the remedy does largely respect
the right to refuse to deal, by preserving the discretion of the firm to choose not to sell to any particular
buyer at any price. For more on a non-discrimination order as a light-touch alternative to ordering dealing,
see infra Section I.C.4.ii.
224
Id. at 350.
225
See id.
226
See id. at 344–45.
227
See id.
228
See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 166, at 1379.
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apposite as authority for the proposition that the right to refuse to deal does
not block liability for arbitrage prevention.229 Nonetheless, it remains true
that in United Shoe the court ordered a firm to deal for the express purpose
of promoting resale.
2. Prior Dealings and Other Considerations
Absent any case directly on point, the question whether the prevention
of arbitrage is covered by the right to refuse to deal can be decided only by
application of general antitrust rules governing refusals to deal.230 These
rules strongly suggest that the prevention of arbitrage is not protected by the
right to refuse to deal. Two Supreme Court cases, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp.231 and Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko,232 serve as the basis for the rules.233 In Aspen Skiing, an
owner of three ski mountains worked with the owner of a fourth mountain
to sell a combined pass that allowed skiers access to all four mountains.234
The owner of the three mountains, Ski, pulled out of the combined pass and
refused to sell passes to its mountains to the owner of the fourth mountain,
Highlands, even at retail prices, preventing Highlands from reconstructing
the combined pass on its own. Highlands challenged the refusal as
monopolization and the Court affirmed a jury verdict in Highland’s favor.235
In Trinko, by contrast, Verizon refused to provide high-quality access to the
company’s telephone network to competing telephone service providers
who wanted to use Verizon’s telephone network to connect calls, but the
Court in that case ruled that the refusal to deal did not violate the antitrust
laws.236 The Court appeared ultimately to decide the case on the ground that
because telecom regulators had concurrent authority to compel Verizon to
deal with competitors, antitrust intervention would be inappropriate.237 But
the Court also distinguished the case from Aspen Skiing on a number of
antitrust grounds to which courts look today in deciding the scope of any
antitrust duty to deal with competitors.238

229

See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344–45.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 324–31 (discussing recent lines of refusal to deal cases
involving aftermarket repair parts and price or supply squeezes).
231
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
232
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
233
See id. at 407–16; HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 320–21; Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for
Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683, 696–99 (2011).
234
See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 588–90.
235
See id. at 589–91, 593, 600, 610–11.
236
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402–04, 416.
237
See id. at 411–15.
238
See id. at 404–05, 408–11, 413, 415–16. For a discussion of recent lower court cases applying
Trinko, see Mark S. Popofsky & Ariel A. Martinez, Section 2 and the Rule of Reason: Report from the
Front,
CPI
ANTITRUST
CHRON.,
Mar.
2016,
at
2–3,
230
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The Court in Trinko suggested that for a refusal to deal to be illicit, the
refusal must be motivated by “dreams of monopoly,” which in turn the Court
suggested can be established unambiguously only when the refusal to deal
represents the termination of a prior profitable course of dealing. A firm does
not terminate a profitable course of dealing, the Court reasoned, unless the
firm hopes to substitute even higher, presumably monopoly-based, profits in
the future for the profits lost through the termination of the prior dealing.239
Thus the Court held Ski liable in Aspen Skiing because Ski and Highlands
had made money off of the combined pass for years, and Ski’s refusal to
continue participating in the combined pass therefore suggested malevolent
intent.240 Indeed, the Court emphasized in Trinko that Ski’s refusal in Aspen
Skiing to sell tickets to Highland for resale as part of the combined pass,
even at the same retail prices at which Ski sold tickets to consumers—prices
which were presumably high enough for Ski to cover costs—was
particularly damning evidence of a monopolizing purpose.241 By contrast,
the Court in Trinko observed that Verizon had never provided competitors
access to its network, had tried to provide access only when Congress
compelled the firm to do so, and might well have ended up making a loss on
those compelled dealings with competitors because the prices Verizon could
charge were fixed by regulators. 242 Of course, Verizon’s refusal to deal
might still have been motivated by dreams of monopoly, but it could also
have just represented good business sense, and for that reason the Court
seemed reluctant to condemn the company’s conduct.243
Arbitrage prevention easily meets the prior profitable course of dealing
test suggested by the Court in Trinko. There must always be a prior course
of dealing in prevention of arbitrage cases because the price-personalizing
firm must permit low-price consumers initially to buy for personal use. If
the firm is not willing initially to sell to low-price consumers for personal
use, then the firm cannot personalize prices and will end up selling only at a
single high price to high-price consumers. The price-personalizing firm must
therefore be willing to sell to low-price consumers at low prices, and to cut
low-price consumers off only when they wish to go beyond what they need
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Section-2-and-the-Ruleof-Reason.pdf.
239
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. A number of courts have followed this suggestion. See, e.g., In re
Adderall XR Antitrust Litigation, 754 F.3d 128, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2014); MetroNet Services Corp. v.
Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2004); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064,
1074–76 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044,
1048–49 (2004).
240
See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589–93.
241
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (“In Aspen Skiing, the defendant turned down a proposal to sell at
its own retail price, suggesting a calculation that its future monopoly retail price would be higher.”).
242
See id. at 414 (suggesting that the cost of providing access to its network subjected Verizon to
“death by a thousand cuts” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
243
See id.
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for themselves to buy additional units for resale to high-price consumers.
But that cutting-off of low-price consumers once they start to buy for resale
represents the termination of a prior course of dealing with those low-price
consumers.244
The prior course of dealing between the firm and low-price consumers
must have been profitable because a price-personalizing firm will not
normally sell initial units to low-price consumers at prices that are below
cost and therefore unprofitable.245 Quite to the contrary, in any personalizedpricing scheme, the firm charges all buyers prices that are above cost in the
economic sense.246 Roughly, the firm charges high-price consumers a price
substantially above cost and low-price consumers a price that is only very
slightly above cost, indeed, only just high enough to ensure that it is worth
the firm’s while to sell units to low-price consumers instead of directing the
resources used to produce the units toward their next-most-lucrative uses for
the firm.247 The firm does not make below-cost sales because below-cost
sales reduce the firm’s total profit.248 In other words, all personalized pricing
is retail pricing in the sense of pricing high enough to make selling
worthwhile to the firm. When the price-personalizing firm sells initial units
to low-price consumers who are still buying for themselves and who have
not yet started to buy for resale, the firm engages in a profitable dealing with
consumers whom the firm later cuts off when the firm refuses to sell
additional units to them for resale.
Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested that Trinko also restricts
condemnation of refusals to deal only to refusals to deal in goods that the
firm could produce with existing production capacity, as opposed to refusals
to deal in goods that the firm would be able to produce only by expanding
production capacity.249 Aspen Skiing and Trinko can indeed be distinguished
244
It might be argued in the arbitrage context that the prior dealing required should be in units
intended for resale and not in units intended for personal consumption. Then there would not ordinarily
be prior dealing in arbitrage prevention cases. Interpreting prior dealing in this way makes the
requirement very much like a requirement that the plaintiff have relied on prior dealings in investing in
the plaintiff’s business, only to have the investment lost when dealing is terminated. For a discussion of
this reliance interpretation, see Section I.C.3. Note also that the firm may cut low-price consumers off
simply by refusing to sell additional units to them, by raising prices for those additional units, or using
property or contract rules to prevent resale of those additional units. See supra text accompanying notes
115–130.
245
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 446.
246
See id. (noting that under first-degree price discrimination the firm sells to each buyer “who is
willing to pay more than it costs to produce an extra unit of output”). For the economic definition of cost,
see BAUMOL, supra note 51, at 593.
247
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 624 (observing that under price discrimination consumers
with low reservation prices “pay a price approaching the competitive price (which is nonetheless
profitable)” whereas others pay a price “that could be far higher”).
248
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 340 (observing that “[i]f the value of marginal product is less
than its cost, then profits can be increased by decreasing the level” of production).
249
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 321.
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based on this capacity rule. Offering the combined pass would not have
forced Ski to acquire new slopes because Ski appears always to have had
enough room on its slopes to accommodate all skiers using that pass.250 By
contrast, Verizon needed to modify its network in order to provide access to
competitors.251
The prevention of arbitrage satisfies any excess capacity rule. Units that
low-price consumers buy for resale always come from the firm’s existing
capacity because any units that high-price consumers buy from resellers are
units that those high-price consumers do not buy from the firm. As a result,
the firm’s total output remains the same when there is arbitrage as when
there is no arbitrage.252 When the firm must deal with resellers, the firm
suffers a decline in demand from high-price consumers, because those
consumers buy from resellers instead, and an exactly-offsetting increase in
demand from resellers, through whom the high-price consumers now make
their purchases.
The Court in Trinko also touched upon the longstanding rule that for any
refusal to deal to be actionable under the antitrust laws, the market must be
unable independently to produce what the defendant is refusing to supply.253
The good must, in other words, be essential to competition in the market.254
Otherwise, competitors are not really excluded by a denial of access to the
good.255 This requirement was satisfied in both Aspen Skiing and Trinko, and
so did not contribute to the different outcomes of the cases. In Aspen Skiing,
regulatory obstacles prevented both Highlands and any third party from
opening additional slopes to replace those owned by Ski.256 In Trinko,
competing telephone service providers would have found it very difficult to
build their own competing landline telephone networks.257 Indeed, that
difficulty had led Congress to order Verizon to provide competing telephone
service providers with access.258
The essentiality requirement is trivially satisfied in the case of arbitrage
250
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 589–93 (1985)
(discussing sixteen years of history of the all-mountain pass without mentioning a capacity constraint).
251
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004); see
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 321 (“[I]n Trinko, unlike . . . Aspen . . . [,] the plaintiff was asking the
defendant not merely to share out of its excess capacity, but also to design and build additional systems
that it must then share with rivals”).
252
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 625 (observing that the quantity sold is the same under perfect
competition and price discrimination).
253
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (describing the “unavailability of access to the essential facilities”
as an “indispensable requirement” for liability for refusal to deal); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 321
(enforced sharing “should never be offered where the development of alternative sources is feasible”).
254
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 321.
255
See id.
256
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 588–89 (1985).
257
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 403.
258
See id. at 402.
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prevention, because the only way to sell to consumers who are committed to
buying a firm’s product at personalized prices is to resell the firm’s own
product to them at lower prices. Those consumers will not accept other
firms’ products as substitutes. The reason is that the maximum price that a
consumer is willing to pay for a product is the highest price the consumer is
willing to pay without giving up on purchasing the product and buying a
substitute product sold by a competing firm instead.259 When a firm
personalizes prices to equal a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, or
tries but fails and ends up charging a price below the consumer’s maximum
willingness to pay, the firm’s product faces no competition from other firms’
products with respect to that consumer, because the prices the firm charges
are, by design, low enough to ensure that the consumer prefers to purchase
the firm’s product.260 It follows that the only way for anyone, including a
reseller, to compete for that consumer is to offer the same product to the
consumer at a lower price than the firm is charging.261 When the firm refuses
to sell units of its product to low-price consumers for resale, the firm is
therefore refusing to deal in an input that is essential for anyone to compete
for the firm’s consumers, given the personalized prices that the firm is
charging to those consumers.
3. The Irrelevance of Reliance
Herbert Hovenkamp has also suggested that under Trinko a refusal to
deal can be condemned only if the target of the refusal made a substantial
investment in reliance on the expectation that the firm would continue a prior
course of dealing.262 The existence of a reliance interest does indeed
distinguish Aspen Skiing from Trinko.263 In Aspen Skiing, Highlands

259
See VARIAN, supra note 11, at 4 (describing the consumer’s reservation price as the highest at
which the consumer is still willing to purchase the good).
260
See id.
261
See Carroll & Coates, supra note 87, at 470–71. Another way to compete for the consumer would
be to invent and offer a new product that the consumer prefers. The essentiality requirement does not,
however, require that the refusal to deal relate to an input that cannot be invented around, only that the
refusal to deal relate to an input that is essential for competition given existing technology. Otherwise it
would have been no antitrust violation for Ski to refuse to continue to participate in the combined fourmountain pass, because Highlands could have invented a new sport preferred by skiers and uniquely
suited to Highlands’ mountain, thereby allowing Highlands to continue to compete with Ski without
needing to use the combined four-mountain pass. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589–91, 593, 600, 610–
11.
262
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 319–20, 321 (arguing that the exception to the right to refuse
to deal covers only cases in which there was reliance and also observing that “[t]he antitrust law requiring
a dominant firm to deal with its rivals must be regarded as a severe exception” and “is inimical to antitrust
goals”).
263
See id. at 319 (“Reading Aspen to create a new obligation to deal where no arrangement had
existed before is a significant extension of its holding. It is one thing to condemn a dominant firm’s
withdrawal from a venture that the parties had previously developed by negotiation, and one upon which

2019]

PERSONALIZED PRICING AS MONOPOLIZATION

361

appeared unable to compete with Ski in the absence of the combined pass.264
Thus any investment Highlands made in developing and operating its
mountain during the decades when the firms offered the combined pass was
made by Highlands in reliance on the continued existence of the pass.265 By
contrast, in Trinko, there was no suggestion that competitors had ever
expected to have access to Verizon’s network before Congress compelled
access.266 So competitors likely had not made substantial investments in
reliance upon having access.267
If Trinko does impose a reliance requirement, then the promotion of
arbitrage would not always be illicit. Only low-price consumers who invest
in resale in reliance on their ability to buy initial units for personal
consumption would be able to challenge the firm’s refusal to sell units for
resale. But the weakness of the case for a reliance requirement suggests that
arbitrage prevention claims will not face this obstacle. Indeed, there are three
good reasons not to read Trinko as creating a reliance requirement. The first
is that the Trinko opinion makes no explicit reference to such a requirement
and the lower courts have not read the opinion to impose one.268 The second
is that the concept of reliance plays no role anywhere else in antitrust
policy.269 And the third, and most important, reason is that the only value of
reliance as a criterion for distinguishing between licit and illicit refusals to
deal lies in reliance’s utility as a proxy for the existence of a prior profitable
course of dealing, because firms tend to make investments in reliance on
prior dealings. But absent a prior profitable course of dealing, reliance has
no independent power to reveal “dreams of monopoly.” A firm may cancel
planned dealings with competitors upon which the competitors have relied
because the firm has concluded that the dealings would not be profitable at
all, rather than because the firm has concluded that the firm can earn
monopoly profits from the cancellation.270 By contrast, absent a change in
market conditions, a firm that terminates a prior profitable course of dealing
cannot have done so out of concern that continuing the dealing would be
the lesser firm has come to rely. It is quite another to ask a court to create a joint venture for two firms
that have not cooperated in the past.”).
264
See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 594–95.
265
See id. at 595–99, 611.
266
See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004).
267
See id. at 415–16.
268
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 390 (citing no cases in support of statement approving of
condemnation of “a dominant firm’s withdrawal from a venture . . . upon which the lesser firm has come
to rely”).
269
The frustration of reliance is of course a powerful weapon wielded by firms against competitors.
But condemnation of its use is primarily the province of tort claims such as fraud, which provides
recovery to a firm that has reasonably relied upon another firm’s intentional misrepresentation. See John
C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud Symposium: Dan B. Dobbs Conference on Economic
Tort Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2006).
270
See supra text accompanying note 138; Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
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unprofitable, suggesting that the termination must lead to the even greater
profits associated with monopoly.271
4. Remediability
i.

Forcing Resale Leads Neither to Collusion nor Price
Administration

The Court in Trinko also suggested that a major reason for judicial
reluctance to condemn refusals to deal is concern that the natural remedy,
which is to compel dealing, either facilitates collusion between the parties
to the case or puts the courts in the unacceptable position of having to dictate
prices and other terms of dealing.272 Remedies for the prevention of arbitrage
do not, however, put the courts in either position.273
The natural remedy for an illicit refusal to deal is indeed for the court to
order the firm to deal.274 In the context of the prevention of arbitrage, that
means ordering the firm to sell units to low-price consumers for resale.275 To
prevent the firm from discouraging resale by raising prices to extract some
of the low-price consumer’s gains from resale, the court must order the firm
to charge the low-price consumer the same price on units the consumer
wishes to resell as the lowest price the firm charges the consumer for units
that the consumer uses for personal consumption.276 To prevent the firm
from relying upon product characteristics such as customization or status as
a service to prevent resale, the court must also require the firm to provide
consumers with a platform for trading in rights to purchase the firm’s
products at the lowest prices personalized to the reseller.277
Forcing dealing in this way does not, however, implicate the concerns
expressed by the Court in Trinko regarding the remedy of forced dealing.278
271

See id.
See id. at 407–08 (“Enforced sharing . . . requires antitrust courts to act as central planners,
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill-suited.
Moreover, compelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust:
collusion.”).
273
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 322.
274
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 393 (treating liability for refusal to deal as synonymous with
a “duty to deal”).
275
See supra Section I.A.3.
276
For the adjustment of prices to extract resale profits as a form of arbitrage prevention, see supra
text accompanying note 115. Requiring the firm to continue to charge the lowest price the firm has
offered to the consumer ensures that the firm cannot manipulate personalized prices for consumption
units to ensure that under the court order resale units are sold at inflated prices. Of course, the firm could
also manipulate the lowest price the firm charges for consumption units in order to target a high price on
resale units, but that would shift the entire personalized price schedule up toward the high prices charged
to high-price consumers, effectively defeating the goal of personalized pricing, which is to charge
different prices for each unit of the product sold.
277
For the refusal to allow resellers to trade purchase rights as a form of arbitrage prevention, see
supra text accompanying note 151.
278
See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407–8 (2004).
272
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One concern raised by the Court is that enforced dealing could create an
environment of cooperation between competitors that might end with
collusion and the fixing of higher prices to consumers.279 Forcing Ski to
work with Highlands to create a four-mountain pass could, for example, lead
the two slope operators to collude in ways that harm consumers, by agreeing
not to engage in a competitive race to invest in expensive upgrades to
facilities.280 This concern does not arise in the arbitrage prevention context,
however, because it is consumers themselves who are the competitors in this
context.281 Ordering the price-personalizing firm to deal with competitors in
this context would amount only to requiring the firm to sell to its own
customers, as opposed to requiring the firm to enter into dealings with firms
selling different, but competing, products. There is therefore no danger that
forced dealing would require a firm to interact with other firms competing
in the same interbrand market, much less lead to cartelization of an
industry.282 The worst that could result from forced dealing in this context
would be that the firm might be able to continue personalizing prices by
using profits from sales to high-price consumers to bribe some low-price
consumers not to engage in arbitrage.283 But even then the remedy would
still temper the effects of personalized pricing, because the bribe would
return some of the surplus extracted from consumers via personalized
pricing back to consumers.
A second concern about forced dealing expressed by the Court in Trinko
is that forced dealing requires courts to engage in price administration.284
The Court famously observed that compelling dealing requires courts to “act
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms
of” sale.285 The different outcomes in Aspen Skiing and Trinko may be
attributed in part to this concern. In Aspen Skiing, forced dealing meant
requiring Ski to reinstitute a product that had existed in the past, giving the
Court some baseline to use in supervising cooperation between Ski and
Highlands going forward.286 By contrast, in Trinko, in which the Court
ultimately refused to find liability, the absence of a prior record of dealing
between Verizon and its competitors would have required the Court to set
network access prices without having terms of prior dealing to use as a
279

Id. at 408.
For more on Aspen Skiing, see supra text accompanying note 233.
281
See supra paragraph accompanying note 114.
282
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 191 (describing a cartel as “an agreement among otherwise
competing firms”).
283
By contrast, in the absence of arbitrage or collusion of this kind, consumers get no surplus. See
VARIAN, supra note 11, at 446.
284
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 322.
285
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
286
See Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1984),
aff’d, 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (describing the court’s order).
280
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guide. Courts would not need to engage in price administration in order to
force firms to permit resale in the personalized pricing context. Just as in
Aspen Skiing, in the case of personalized pricing there always is a prior
course of dealing—namely, the sales made by the firm to low-price
consumers for personal consumption—that the courts can use as a baseline
in setting the prices at which firms are required to offer purchase rights to
low-price consumers.288
ii.

Compelling Impersonal Pricing Would Be Even Less
Burdensome

Although forced sharing neither creates the harms normally to be feared
from collusion nor leads to the judicial price-setting normally to be feared
from judicially-compelled dealing, and as a result gives no grounds to the
courts for exempting arbitrage prevention from condemnation as
monopolization, forced dealing is not the remedy that least implicates
concerns regarding collusion or price administration.289 That honor falls
instead to the remedy of ordering the firm to stop charging personalized
prices and to start charging impersonal prices, whether uniform or group
based, instead. Rather than compelling firms to sell units to low-price
consumers for resale at the same personalized prices at which the firms sell
to low-price consumers for personal consumption, which is what the forced
sharing remedy does, the courts could instead simply order firms not to
personalize prices, while still leaving it to firms to continue to exercise
complete discretion over whether to sell, to whom, and what (impersonal)
prices to charge.
An order that a firm not personalize prices can lead neither to collusion
nor price administration.290 Impersonal pricing cannot promote collusion of
any degree or kind, because unlike forced sharing an order not to personalize
prices does not require that the firm cooperate with resellers at all. An order
not to personalize prices simply constrains the manner in which the firm can
structure its prices. That is an improvement over forced resale, which, as
noted above, could facilitate collusion between the firm and resellers that
might preserve some personalized pricing, even if forced resale would not
287
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408, 410 (observing that “[e]nforced sharing also requires antitrust courts
to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for
which they are ill-suited” and that “the services allegedly withheld are not otherwise marketed or
available to the public”).
288
For the forced sale of purchase rights as a component of forced dealing in arbitrage-prevention
cases, see supra text accompanying note 276. If a buyer purchases multiple units for personal
consumption, possibly at different prices given the different valuations the buyer may place on each unit,
then the buyer will want to purchase units for resale at the best of the prices at which the buyer purchases
the units for personal consumption. The seller should be required to honor those terms. See supra note
275.
289
See supra Section I.C.4.i.
290
Cf. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
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lead to interbrand collusion. An order that a firm not personalize prices
would also avoid judicial price administration to a greater extent than would
forced resale.292 Courts issuing an order not to personalize prices would not
need to require the firm to deal and therefore would not need to set price,
quantity, or other terms, even by reference to past terms.293 The firm could
instead continue to set all the terms of sale, including price, subject only to
the condition that the firm not personalize the price the firm charges for each
unit that the firm sells.
Courts feel much more comfortable prohibiting discrimination than they
feel forcing dealing, which suggests that courts would feel more comfortable
enforcing orders prohibiting the discrimination in prices based on individual
willingness to pay that is personalized pricing than they would feel forcing
firms to sell to resellers. Indeed, the comfort of the courts with prohibitions
on discrimination runs very deep. Formal equality is a fundamental principle
of the legal system, embodied in the rule of stare decisis that requires that
courts themselves not discriminate based on irrelevant characteristics.294
Like cases must be treated alike.295 Every time a court concludes that a
particular case is governed by precedent, the court decides that the defendant
in the case is similarly situated to the defendant in the precedential case and
must therefore be treated by the court in the same way as the court treated
the defendant in the precedential case.296 Courts also insist that like be
treated alike in business conducted outside of the court system whenever the
courts apply the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, or some other anti-discrimination statute.297 Under these rules,
courts insist, for example, that like job applicants be treated alike by
employers.298 The courts, in other words, know how to police discrimination,

291

See supra text accompanying note 282.
For the ability of courts to force resale without administering prices, see supra text
accompanying note 287.
293
Cf. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
294
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very concept of
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”).
295
See Andrei Marmor, Should Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 27, 27 (2005)
(“It is a familiar slogan in legal circles that ‘like cases should be treated alike.’”).
296
See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595–96 (1987) (“To fail to treat similar
cases similarly, it is argued, is arbitrary, and consequently unjust or unfair. . . . Where the consistency
among decisions takes place over time, we call our decisional rule ‘precedent.’”).
297
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2018); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., 490 U.S.
900, 904, 912 (1989) (stating that a system “that treats similarly situated employees differently . . . can
be challenged at any time” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
298
See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1157, 1164–65 (1991) (“It is illegal to disfavor members of protected groups who are, without any
292
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and do it all the time. Extending their powers to prohibit a particular kind of
discrimination in pricing should be easy.
Indeed, policing discrimination in pricing should be no harder for the
courts to carry out than policing discrimination in all the other areas in which
the courts police discrimination today. In both price and non-price
discrimination cases, the key problem is defining similarity.299 In the case of
employment discrimination in hiring, for example, the key issue is whether
two job candidates are similarly qualified for the position, but were treated
differently.300 That in turn requires courts to make difficult decisions about
what constitutes qualification for a job.301 In the case of pricing, the
existence of discrimination turns on the question whether the products for
which the firm personalizes prices are the same in the sense that resellers
would be able profitably to arbitrage the price differences if the firm were to
make a market in the resale of price rights.302 To be sure, that is a complex
question, but it is not clear that the question is more complex than the
question whether one employee would perform better than another at work.
If courts can handle discrimination cases involving complex social questions
like equal treatment in employment then they can handle the question
whether a firm is personalizing prices.
Enforcing non-personalization in pricing is not only no harder than
enforcing non-discrimination in other areas, but also easier than the
alternative remedy of enforcing dealing. Recall that firms can prevent
arbitrage in two ways: by personalizing prices that extract any profits that a
low-price consumer can earn from arbitrage and by refusing to create an
online platform that would allow consumers to trade their rights to their
personalized prices.303 As a remedy for price-based arbitrage prevention, a
non-personalization order is less expensive to enforce than an order
compelling sale at low personalized prices because a non-personalization
order requires only that courts review prices for personalization, whereas a
compelled sale order requires both review of prices (to ensure that they are
the same low prices charged for personal consumption) and review of the
shifts in the organization of employers’ firms, as ‘market productive’ as others who receive the benefits,
such as jobs, promotions, or pay, that members of the protected group seek.”).
299
See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 859 (2002) (lamenting the “similarly situated” requirement
because “[a]ny court could find, however, that because of one thing or another an employee is not
similarly situated to another employee”).
300
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring a showing that
plaintiff was qualified for the job in order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in hiring);
Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621, 646–48 (1982) (describing the qualification
requirement in discrimination law as “more than any other, . . . difficult to define”).
301
See Player, supra note 300, at 646–48.
302
See supra Section I.B.3.
303
See supra text accompanying note 144.
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selling practices of the firm to ensure that the firm in fact sells to all
consumers who wish to buy for resale. As a remedy for failure to permit
rights trading, a non-personalization order is similarly less expensive to
enforce than an order compelling sale of rights to buy at low personalized
prices, because a non-personalization order requires only review of prices,
whereas a compelled sale order requires not only review of the prices
charged by the firm for purchase rights, but two additional things. The court
must ensure that the firm supplies all willing buyers with purchase rights and
ensure that end consumers are in fact able to redeem their rights in exchange
for the product.304 Thus the forced dealing remedy requires everything that
non-personalization requires of courts, and more.
Courts applying the antitrust laws have broad authority to impose any
remedy that makes victims whole, not limited to reversing the conduct that
serves as the basis for the underlying violation of the antitrust laws, and
courts in fact have enforced orders compelling non-discriminatory pricing
in lieu of forced sharing.305 Consider the Ninth Circuit’s review, in Image
Tech. Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., of an order requiring both sales
at judicially-mandated prices and non-discrimination in pricing.306 The
conduct at issue in the case was a refusal by Kodak to sell parts to
independent suppliers of copier repair services who competed with Kodak
in the repair market.307 The Supreme Court ruled the conduct potentially
anticompetitive and on remand the district court ordered Kodak to sell parts
to all buyers at reasonable and non-discriminatory prices.308 Concerned that
the reasonableness requirement “involves the court in a matter generally
considered beyond our function, namely, direct price administration,” the
Ninth Circuit struck the reasonableness requirement from the district court’s
order, reflecting judicial reluctance to engage in price administration.309 But
the court preserved the requirement of non-discrimination in pricing,
observing that “Kodak should be permitted to charge all of its customers . .
304
Cf. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004)
(lamenting the fact that “[n]ew systems must be designed and implemented simply to make . . . access
possible”).
305
See FTC v. Nat’l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429–30 (1957) (approving the enjoining of an
otherwise lawful pricing practice to remedy an antitrust violation); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 166, at 1379
(“The most common remedy in civil prosecutions is termination of the unlawful conduct. But . . . the
typical equitable remedy also includes restrictions on the conduct of the defendants intended to both
prevent the conduct from re-occurring and to restore competitive conditions that may have been altered
by the conduct.”).
306
See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224–26 (9th Cir. 1997).
307
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 458 (1992).
308
See id. at 480–86 (holding that Kodak’s conduct could violate the Sherman Act’s prohibition on
monopolization); Post-Judgment Memorandum on Motion for Permanent Injunction, Image Tech.
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C 87–1686 AWT, 1996 WL 101173, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
1996) (defending reasonable pricing order).
309
Image Tech., 125 F.3d at 1226.
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. any nondiscriminatory price that the market will bear.” The court showed
no concern at all about the capacity of the district court to prohibit
discrimination in pricing, and affirmed the non-discrimination order even
though as a technical matter the conduct that violated the antitrust laws in
the case was Kodak’s refusal to deal with independent servicers at
reasonable prices, not Kodak’s charging of discriminatory prices to
servicers.311
Non-personalization of prices is only a viable remedy, however, if the
government is the primary enforcer of an antitrust prohibition on arbitrage
prevention.312 The non-personalization remedy reduces the incentives of all
other possible enforcers—from low-price consumers who wish to engage in
resale, to both low- and high-price consumers buying for personal
consumption—to sue.313 The low-price consumer engaged in resale destroys
its own resale market by winning suit for an order to put an end to the
personalization of prices, because without the personalization of prices, and
the consequent difference between the prices charged by the firm to the lowprice consumer and the prices charged by the firm to high-price consumers,
resale opportunities disappear.314 The low-price consumer who buys for
personal consumption but not for resale also may not have anything to gain
from suing for an order to put an end to the personalization of prices, because
non-personalized prices may price the low-price consumer out of the
310

Id. at 1225–26.
See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458, 483, 486. Image Tech. is good authority for the use of an
order prohibiting personalized pricing as a remedy for a refusal to deal, but not entirely on point as
authority for the proposition that arbitrage prevention is anticompetitive. The purpose of the nondiscrimination order in Image Tech. was to ensure that competitors of Kodak in the market to repair
copiers—that is, interbrand competitors—would gain equal access to Kodak-made spare parts, not to
ensure that independent servicers would have the chance to arbitrage personalized pricing by Kodak of
those spare parts (although there was evidence that Kodak had engaged in discriminatory pricing of the
parts). See Image Tech., 125 F.3d at 1225 (indicating that the goal of the non-discrimination order is to
“end Kodak’s service monopoly”); Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 457 (“Some customers found that the
[competitors’] service was of higher quality.”).
In a further reflection of the comfort of the courts with ordering non-discrimination in pricing, the
court in United Shoe also ordered United Shoe to stop discriminating in the rates at which the company
leased machinery. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 349 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (ordering “discriminatory . . . charges . . . removed”). Unlike
Image Tech., United Shoe does not stand for the proposition that courts are willing to go beyond mere
reversal of the conduct giving rise to antitrust liability in order to compel non-discrimination, however,
because in United Shoe the theory of liability was that United Shoe had used discriminatory prices
themselves to discourage competitors from entering the company’s markets. See supra Section I.C.1.
Thus the non-discrimination order did no more than reverse the conduct that gave rise to antitrust liability.
312
The government is already an important enforcer of the antitrust laws. See generally
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 642–50 (providing an overview of government enforcement of the antitrust
laws).
313
See generally id. at 652 (discussing private enforcement of the antitrust laws).
314
Resale opportunities disappear only if the firm turns to uniform pricing in response to the order
not to personalize prices. If the firm reverts to group-based pricing instead, then resale opportunities
lessen, but do not disappear entirely. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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315

market. By contrast, high-price consumers have some incentive to sue for
non-personalization of prices, because non-personalized prices are lower for
high-price consumers.316 But because a non-personalization order does not
preclude the firm from refusing to sell to any consumer, a vindictive firm
might be able credibly to threaten to punish high-price consumers for
bringing suit by denying them access to the product forever, eliminating any
gains they might enjoy from forcing the firm to charge non-personalized
prices.317 Because private plaintiffs of all stripes lack the full incentive to
challenge the personalization of prices, the government must be the primary
challenger.
II. PERSONALIZED PRICING AS A STANDALONE ANTITRUST VIOLATION
Recognizing arbitrage prevention as monopolization, and ordering firms
not to continue personalizing prices when they are caught preventing
arbitrage, would seem at first glance to guarantee a world without
personalized pricing.318 But in fact the power of an order not to personalize
prices, or indeed of any remedy, including a forced dealing remedy, is
limited, because these remedies can only be imposed in response to conduct
that prevents arbitrage.319 Firms that do not raise prices to extract gains from
resale, and which permit the resale of purchase rights, do not violate the
prohibition on arbitrage prevention and therefore are not subject to remedial
action by the courts.320 In theory, these firms should be unable to personalize
prices.321 But in practice they might still be able to do so.
The reason is not that resale would somehow remain prohibitively
costly, despite the forbearance of firms from practices that restrict arbitrage.
If resale were to remain too costly, then the product sold by the firm to lowprice buyers would simply not count as the same product as the product sold
by the firm to high-price buyers.322 Recall that the financial viability of
resale, after all costs are taken into account, determines whether two
products, the resold product and the product for which the ultimate buyer
substitutes the resold product, are the same, and therefore whether the
315

See supra text accompanying note 67.
See supra text accompanying note 56.
317
See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 4
(1988) (arguing that people can act against interest to solve commitment problems).
318
See supra Section I.C.4.ii.
319
See LAYCOCK, supra note 128, at 1 (“A remedy is anything a court can do for a litigant who has
been wronged or is about to be wronged.”). It is the inverse of Blackstone’s famous remark that “where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy,” namely, that where there is no legal right, there is also
no legal remedy, which is the more scrupulously honored of the two. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, 23; see John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 87, 87 (1999).
320
See LAYCOCK, supra note 128, at 1.
321
See supra Sections I.A.3, I.A.4.
322
See supra Section I.B.3.
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personalization of prices for the two products counts as the personalization
of prices for the same product.323 If resale remains prohibitively costly even
after firms have eliminated all restraints on resale, it follows that the
differentially-priced products in question are not actually the same product,
and personalized pricing of the same product is therefore not actually taking
place.
The reason, instead, for which personalized pricing might persist despite
the absence of restraints on, and concomitant financial viability of, arbitrage
is that even when resale is unrestrained and financially viable, there is no
guarantee that resellers will in fact fully exploit the opportunity to resell, and
therefore no guarantee that personalized pricing will disappear.324 Antitrust
has long recognized that a firm can have a monopoly even without engaging
in anticompetitive conduct, simply because, through laziness, incompetence,
or pure accident, no competitor mounts a challenge.325 It follows that, at least
in some markets, personalized pricing will persist despite antitrust
condemnation of arbitrage prevention, and consumers will therefore
continue to be harmed. If antitrust wishes fully to protect consumers from
personalized pricing, and antitrust’s consumer protection mission suggests
that antitrust should wish to do that, then antitrust should go beyond treating
arbitrage prevention as an antitrust violation to treat the act of personalizing
prices itself as a violation of the antitrust laws.326 Without directly
323

See supra text accompanying note 216.
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[P]ersons
may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly, automatically so to say: that is, without
having intended either to put an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising when
none had existed; they may become monopolists by force of accident.”).
325
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); Oliver E. Williamson,
Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512,
1518–22 (1972).
326
For antitrust’s consumer welfare mission, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original
and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93–
96 (1982) (“[The legislative d]ebates [surrounding passage of the Sherman Act] strongly suggest that
Congress condemned trusts and monopolies because they had enough market power to raise prices and
‘unfairly’ extract wealth from consumers, turning it into monopoly profits.”).
Treating the act of personalizing prices itself as a violation of the antitrust laws would not only
allow antitrust to reach personalized pricing made possible by the laziness or incompetence of resellers,
but also allow antitrust to reach a second area of personalized pricing that would not be reached by
condemning only the prevention of arbitrage. That area is personalized pricing of units of a good sold to
the same consumer. Recall that personalized pricing is the charging of maximum willingness to pay on
a unit basis. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Even if a firm sells a particular product only to a
single consumer, the firm can personalize prices by charging the consumer the maximum the consumer
is willing to pay for each unit. See Varian, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that “[f]irst-degree, or perfect price
discrimination involves the seller charging a different price for each unit of the good in such a way that
the price charged for each unit is equal to the maximum willingness to pay for that unit.”). Coca-Cola
might charge, for example, $3.00 for the first unit of Coke the consumer buys, $2.50 for the second,
$1.00 for the third, and so on. Personalized pricing is just as harmful when aimed at a single consumer
purchasing multiple units as when it is aimed at multiple purchasers. Cf. supra Section I.A.1. As a result
of personalized pricing, the Coke buyer may go from purchasing two Cokes at $2.50 each, and therefore
324
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condemning the act of personalizing prices, antitrust cannot hope fully to
stamp out that act.
The courts should treat the act of personalizing prices as a free-standing
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, tied perhaps to the general
language of Section 2, which prohibits “monopoliz[ation]” without defining
the term.327 The courts cannot take the alternative approach of tying the
prohibition to the monopolization rules discussed in this article—the
requirements of anticompetitive conduct and monopoly power that have
been developed by the courts as interpretations of the language of Section
2—because of the difficulty associated with treating the act of personalizing
prices itself as anticompetitive conduct.328 Unlike the act of limiting
arbitrage, the act of personalizing prices does not itself stifle intrabrand
competition, and so the requirement of harm to competition, an essential
element of a traditional monopolization claim, is missing.329
Relying upon antitrust’s consumer protection goal to create a freestanding prohibition on personalized pricing out of whole cloth would not
be altogether unprecedented, because antitrust has relied on the consumer
welfare standard radically to alter antitrust rules in the past.330 Indeed, the
Chicago School of antitrust analysis brought the consumer welfare standard
into antitrust precisely for that purpose.331 The Chicago School believed that
prevailing antitrust rules punished firms that dominated markets for the
legitimate purpose of controlling the resources necessary to produce the best

enjoying a consumer surplus of 52 cents, to purchasing three Cokes at the aforementioned prices and
enjoying only 3 cents of consumers surplus (assuming that the firm personalizes prices for each unit to
be one penny below the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for that unit). If a firm sells a particular
product to multiple consumers, then condemnation of arbitrage prevention forces the firm to stop
personalizing the prices of multiple units sold to the same consumer, because arbitrage prevention is
necessary to stop different consumers from reselling to each other some of the multiple pricepersonalized units sold to them by the firm. The consumer charged $1.00 for a third can of Coke could,
for example, profitably resell that can to the consumer that Coca-Cola wishes to charge $3.00 for a first
can of Coke. The capacious definition of product sameness advocated in Section I.B.3 ensures that very
few products, even individually-customized products, will be sold only to a single individual consumer
for antitrust purposes. But there may still be some unique products that a firm sells only to a single
consumer. For those products, condemnation of personalized pricing itself would restore some surplus
to the individual consumers who buy them. For a related discussion, see supra note 44.
327
See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”).
328
See supra text accompanying note 45. For a discussion of the evolution of the monopolization
requirement as a set of interpretations of Section 2, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 291–92.
329
See supra text accompanying note 45.
330
See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1741,
1755–63 (2018).
331
See George L. Priest, Bork’s Strategy and the Influence of the Chicago School on Modern
Antitrust Law, 57 J.L. & ECON. S1, S10–11 (2014).
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332

quality products at the lowest cost.
The courts ultimately used the
consumer welfare standard as the sole justification for altering the antitrust
laws to tolerate salutary dominance, despite the lack of any other basis in
statute or caselaw for doing so.333 The courts reversed longstanding
prohibitions on exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, for example,
replacing those prohibitions with case-by-case review for harm to
consumers.334 And the courts stopped condemning mergers in concentrated
industries out of hand.335 The courts made those and other changes without
express authorization from Congress, or the aid of precedent, but simply
because they concluded that antitrust’s mission is to protect consumers—the
consumer welfare standard—and they believed that these changes to the law
would be good for consumers.336 There is no reason for which the consumer
welfare standard should only be used to restrict the ambit of antitrust rules,
sparing some conduct for the sake of expanding consumer welfare, but
should never be used to expand the ambit of antitrust rules, by extending
them to condemn new categories of conduct, such as personalized pricing.337
CONCLUSION
The information age promises to make personalized pricing a reality, at
332
In the decades preceding the triumph of the Chicago School in the 1970s, the courts had tended
to pursue the promotion of competition regardless of the effect of competition on consumers. See N. Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while
at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by
the Act is competition.”); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must
give effect to that decision.”). For an example of the Chicago School rejoinder, see Robert H. Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 12 (1966) (“Congress was very
concerned that the law should not interfere with business efficiency. This concern, which was repeatedly
stressed, was so strong that it led Congress to agree that monopoly itself was lawful if it was gained and
maintained only by superior efficiency. Thus the desire to protect small firms from annihilation by
monopoly-minded rivals did not extend an inch beyond the bounds of the consumer-welfare rationale.”).
333
For an overview of these changes, see Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy
in U.S. Antitrust, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 11, 22 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
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See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Indispensability of Per Se Rules in Budget-Constrained Antitrust
Adjudication 31–33 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2896453.
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See id. at 29–31.
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For the full list of rule changes, see id. at 27–36. For the unprecedented nature of the changes,
see Woodcock, supra note 330, at 1755–63. The changes were so sudden, and ungrounded in existing
law, that the Supreme Court never ratified the changes in the merger context, and indeed still has not
done so through to the present day. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 22, at 452–55.
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least approximately. As the only regulatory regime having the general
mission of protecting consumer welfare in the economic sense, antitrust can
block the emergence of this consumer-surplus-reducing practice. One
approach would be for antitrust to recognize that anticompetitive conduct
lies at the heart of much personalized pricing.338 For no firm can personalize
prices unless the firm can stop low-price buyers from reselling the product
to high-price buyers. To personalize prices, then, firms generally must
impose restraints on arbitrage, and those restraints are anticompetitive. They
undermine resale competition in the market to buy the firm’s own product.
The refusal of a firm to sell units of its product for resale is not protected
by the general right of firms to choose their clients. In recent decades, the
courts have recognized that the right to refuse to deal does not protect the
termination of a prior profitable course of dealing with a competitor. The
refusal of a price-personalizing firm to deal with a low-price buyer seeking
to buy additional units for resale is precisely the sort of termination of a prior
profitable course of dealing that the courts remain willing to condemn.
Even when the courts are willing to condemn a refusal to deal, such as
the refusal to sell to resellers that underpins personalized pricing, the courts
hesitate to provide a remedy because they worry about the administrability
of judicially-compelled dealings between competitors. But condemning
restraints on arbitrage does not implicate this concern, because courts have
available an alternative remedy to forced dealing that is more effective at
alleviating the harm of restrictions on arbitrage. That alternative remedy is
directly to order firms not to personalize prices. Such an order would
preserve for a firm the discretion to decide whether or not to sell to any
particular buyer, as well as the discretion of the firm to decide the absolute
prices to charge for its product, so long as the prices are not personalized on
a unit basis. Thus the courts could avoid compelling firms to deal with any
particular buyer, and avoid the problem of setting absolute price levels,
while still forcing offenders to desist from personalizing prices.
Antitrust condemnation of restraints on arbitrage are unlikely, however,
to preclude all personalized pricing, because some firms may be able to
escape competition from resellers out of luck, rather than by taking steps to
prevent arbitrage. Antitrust can fully eliminate personalized pricing only by
recognizing the act of personalizing prices itself as an independent violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The courts have broad authority to take
that step under antitrust’s consumer welfare standard, because personalized
pricing always harms consumers.
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For other approaches, see Woodcock, supra note 7, at 1400–16.

